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SEMANTIC  NETWORKS 
FRITZ LEHMANN 
124 Parsons Avenue, Webster Groves, Missouri 63119, U.S.A. 
Abstract - -  A semantic network is a graph of the structure of meaning. This article introduces 
senmntic network systems and their importance in Artificial Intelligence, followed by I. the early 
background; II. a summary of the basic ideas and issues including link types, frame systems, case 
relations, llnk valence, abstraction, i heritance hierarchies and logic extensions; and III. a survey of 
'world-structuring' systems including ontologies, causal ink models, continuous models, relevance, 
formal dictionaries, emantic primitives and intersecting inference hierarddes. Speed and practical 
impleme~atation are briefly discussed. The conclusion argues for a synthesis of relational graph theory, 
graph-grmmnar theory and order theory based on semantic primitives and multiple intersecting 
inference hierarchies. 
• .. when controversies arise, it will not be a work of learned disputation between two 
philosophers, but between two computists. It will be enough for them to take pen in 
hand, sit at the abacus, and say to each other, as friends: 'Let us cMculatet. ' 
- -  Leibniz 
All thought is diagrammatic. 
- -  Charles S. Peirce 
1. INTRODUCTION 
A computer or robot seems stupid when you have to tell it exactly what to do and how to do 
it. One aim of Artificial Intelligience (AI) is to let you just describe your problem and have 
the machine solve it with general reasoning techniques. Typically, a general-purpose r asoning 
program operates on a formal description of the particular problem. Like a capable human being, 
the program may need to use background knowledge of the subject area along with general 
common sense knowledge about the world. Somehow this knowledge must be represented in
the machine. In the last 15 years attention in AI has shifted away from reasoning programs to 
knowledge representation as the primary challenge. Instead of using natural anguages (which are 
highly arbitrary and ambiguous), such knowledge is often represented using abstract conceptual 
structures called semantic networks• 
Certain computing tasks vital to industry, the professions, and the military have reached a 
practical limit beyond which conventional computing (ordinary data processing and mathematical 
modelling) cannot go. These tasks require explicit, in-depth conceptual analysis, rather than just 
repetitive processing of the elements of a model. In an AI system, the concepts and principles of 
the subject domain are arranged in an ordered structure called a Knowledge Base. Transcending 
mere storage and retrieval of asserted facts, the computer uses this structure to infer other 
knowledge from that which has been stored directly. This depends on using the fundamental 
semantic structure of the concepts involved, as opposed to the syntactic (grammar) structure of 
any particular language. 
Several quite different sentences in English (or other languages) can all have the same essential 
meaning and underlying semantic structure: a network of interrelated conceptual units. See 
Figure 1. This is a 'map' of the meaning. A network is also a convenient way to organize 
information in a computer or database. 
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Toby the hungry tiger follows his mother. 
Toby, the son of the tigress he follows, is hungry. 
The tiger is followed by her hungry cub Toby. 
Hunger grips Toby, son of the tigress leading him. 
She who bore hungry tiger Toby 
is also by him followed. 
Der Tiger Toby, der seiner 
Mutter folgt, hat Hunger. 
Hungry Toby's relation to the tiger 
is one of mother-following. 
3(Toby)3 (z) (Tiger(Toby) A
Tiger(x) A Follows(Toby,x) ^
Mother-of(z,Toby) A Female(x) ^ 
Male(Toby) ^  Hungry(Toby)). 
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Figure 1. All of these sentences share an underlying memfing structure. A 
semantic network is on the right. The heavy lines are asserted relation-links 
between described individuals, forming a relational graph. The d~hed lines 
axe IS-A links in an ¢batraction hier~rch~ of categories used to infer features of 
individuals, qualities and relations. (Here 'follows' and 'parent' may be consid- 
ered as relations, or as conceptual units with 'by' and 'of' as their relations.) 
A semant ic  network  or net  represents knowledge as a net-like graph. 1 An idea, event, 
situation or object almost always has a composite structure; this is represented in a semantic 
network by a corresponding structure of nodes  (drawn as circles or boxes) representing conceptual 
units, and directed l inks (drawn as arrows between the nodes) representing the relations between 
the units. The network in Figure 1 has a relational graph describing two individuals (Toby and 
the unnamed tigress) with their asserted qualities and relations, on top of which is an abstraction 
hierarchy of more general concepts and relations. Prom this combined structure it is possible to 
deduce things about the composite concept as a whole and its relations to other concepts. 
An abstract (graph-theoretic) network can be diagrammed, defined mathematically, pro- 
grammed in a computer, or hard-wired electronically. It becomes emantic when you assign 
a meaning to each node and link. Unlike specialized networks and diagrams, semantic networks 
aim to represent any kind of knowledge which can be described in natural anguage. A semantic 
network system includes not only the explicitly stored net structure but also methods for auto- 
matically deriving from that a much larger structure or body of implied knowledge. For example, 
the assertion in Figure 1 that Toby is hungry implies that he is a conscious animal, and every- 
thing true of conscious animals is automatically true of Toby. Almost all systems have structured 
concept-hierarchies or taxonomies used for this kind of derivation (described in Section 6), and 
these hierarchies themselves are also 'semantic networks.' 
In the 1970's, semantic network research emphasizing this 'structure of knowledge' approach 
became predominant in AI, later contending with Rule-based Expert Systems for center stage. 
Since then it has waxed and waned periodically and many of its ideas reappear in other guises 
such as Object-Oriented Systems. Many Expert Systems now include Object-Oriented extensions 
which allow easy implementation of semantic networks (see Section 15). The latest vogue in AI, 
neural nets, often seems to be an opposing, anti-analytic approach using no identifiable symbols 
or concepts in the computer at all, but there are systems (Section 14) which have enough internal 
compositional structure to be used 'semantically.' Semantic networks are seldom claimed to ex- 
ist physically in the brain; rather, they are viewed as idealized reasoning structures with practical 
1 Throughout this volume, "graph" means an interconnected vertex-and-arc (dot-and-line) structure M studied 
in Graph Theory rather than a graph plotted in Cartesia~ X-Y coordinates. 
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computer application. A common goal of this kind of AI is to impart obvious 'common sense' to 
computers. 2 
The specialized semantic network inference methods discussed below are often combined with 
other standard AI reasoning methods uch as rule-based search, automatic theorem-proving, 
constraint satisfaction, machine learning algorithms, and others. 
Semantic networks are used in almost every application area of AI, including natural lan- 
guage understanding, deductive databases, library document retrieval, business planning, medi- 
cal diagnosis, legal case analysis, analogical reasoning, expert systems, robot control, intelligent 
Computer Aided Design, visual pattern recognition, simulated aircraft control, and many more. 
1.1. Overview 
There are now eight major research families of semantic network systems plus countless inde- 
pendent projects around the world. The eight are: 
CONCEPTUAL DEPENDENCY • CONCEPTUAL GRAPHS • ECO • KL-ONE 
PATH-BASED INHERITANCE • PREFERENCE SEMANTICS • PSN • SNEPS 
In some of these there are all sorts of variants and it is quite confusing to the newcomer. The eight 
invited survey articles following this one introduce the basic ideas and give some guidance to the 
research directions within each family. These are followed by 25 articles on diverse subjects in 
the field, a The surveys and articles cover most contemporary work. In this article, following this 
introduction, Par t  I describes the historic origins of semantic networks; Part  I I  covers the basics 
such as frame systems, relational graphs, deep case relations, link valence, inheritance hierarchies, 
IS-A links, relational inheritance and logic extensions; and Par t  I I I  discusses 'world-structures': 
ontologies, continuous models, relevance, dictionaries, semantic primitives and intersecting in- 
ference hierarchies. I then briefly treat some speed and implementation issues. (If you're very 
familiar with semantic networks you can skip Part  II.) My emphasis will be on knowledge struc- 
tures rather than connections with natural anguage or particular notations, and I'll mention how 
the other articles relate to the subject. 
1.P. Flat or Deepf 
Most commercial AI systems are Rule-based Expert Systems with large sets of IF-THEN 
rules supplied by an expert in some field to embody his or her expertise. There is near-universal 
disappointment at the 'flatness,' or lack of structured knowledge, in Expert Systems based on rules 
whose symbols may represent anything at all. It is hard just to keep track of numerous arbitrarily 
interrelated rules, and, during automatic inference, the computational burden of exhanstive search 
through a large space of unconstrained rules is often overwhelming. Serious users are soon 
frustrated by the indiscriminate stupidity of pure rule-based systems. A knowledgeable person 
will spot obvious errors in a description whereas adolt will just accept it. A typical Expert System 
often seems clever due to the suggestive names of internally meaningless ymbols, but the system 
cannot distinguish between telling it "IF a gas pipe bursts THEN gas leaks" and telling it "IF a 
gas pipe bursts THEN Michael Jackson is a parallelogram." It just responds "OK." You quickly 
get a yearning for some real understanding, some 'conceptual structure' forming a deeper model 
of the subject area. The most promising solution is thought o be highly structured Knowledge 
Bases built using Knowledge Representation Systems (semantic networks and symbolic logic are 
two possible representation systems--in the conclusion I'll discuss the difference). In a practical 
application you need to build an ontology of the concepts and principles of the particular subject 
area in question (Section 8); some thorny problem areas even require a general metaphysics. 
Some people like practical things and dislike airy metaphysical discussions. Other people, the 
philosophers among us, have the opposite taste. This difference in temperament is now obsolete: 
to get reliable practical results in AI you have to be a kind of philosopher, and you have to make 
2For this reason AI research examples may often seem trivial to outsiders--most of what is perfectly obvious 
common sense to a three-year-old now eludes the most sophisticated computers. 
3One subject which hardly appears at all in this volume is automatic macldne leaning;  the articles deal mainly 
with representation a d automatic use of knowledge irrespective of how it is obtained. 
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every effort to think deeply and get the philosophy right. Semantic networks and kindred methods 
in AI are mechanized philosophy, and that is what researchers around the world are now doing. 
On the one hand the hard-headed businessman or military planner using AI who s~ys "let's get 
practical and skip the philosophical stuff" is headed for wrong turns, mistakes and rniAfortune 
due to faulty analysis; on the other hand the philosopher who cooks up vast and complicated AI 
theory without testing it on practical examples i likely to drift far from soundness and relevance. 
1.3. Previous Surveys 
Current research on semantic networks is published in various AI and Cognitive Science 
journals, conference proceedings [1], and technical reports issued by universities and corporate 
research centers. 4 For good surveys ee the articles SEMANTIC NETWORKS, INHERITANCE HIER- 
AI~CHmS and FRAME THEORY (by Sowa, Touretzky and Maida, respectively) in The Encylopedia 
of Artificial Intelligence [3], and the first half of an article of Brachman's [4]. Some collections on 
Knowledge Representation cover semantic networks well such as Brachman & Levesque's Readings 
in Knowledge Representation [5], Ringland & Duce's Approaches to Knowledge Representation [6], 
Cercone & McCalla's The Knowledge Frontier [7] and the special issue of IEEE Computer on 
which the last was partly based [8]. Earlier collections which deserve study are Bobrow & Collins' 
Representation and Understanding [9] and Schank & Colby's Computer Models of Thought and 
Language [10]. Many AI textbooks have good coverage of semantic networks uch as Charniak 
& McDermott's Introduction to Artificial Intelligence [11], Nilsson's Principles of Artificial In- 
telligence (in Chapter 9, Structured Object Representations) [12], and Nagao's Knowledge and 
Inference [13]; see also the pertinent parts of Mary Dee Harris' Introduction to Natural Language 
Processing [14] and Burr, Cohen & Feigenbaum's Handbook of Artificial Intelligence [15]. 
The only previous collection in book form specifically devoted to semantic networks is Asso- 
ciative Networks edited by Nicholas Findler which represented the state of the art in 1979 [16]. An 
important new collection, Principles of Semantic Networks edited by John Sown, is in press [17]. 
Relational Models of the Lezicon: Representing Knowledge in Semantic Networks edited by 
Martha Evens covers a variety of relations (links) [18]. 
Part  I. Early Background 
Figure 2. Ages to be 
used by God Him~. The Trinity is explained: the Father is not the Sma mad neither of Them 
is the Holy Ghost, but God is all three. It illustrates IS-A links and IS-NOT-A ll.kt. In 1979 
IS-NOT-A links were reintroduced byFah]man i  NETL [19]. 
4Some technical reports are abstracted in the ACM SIGART B~tlletin and The Artificial Intelligence Com. 
pendium [2]. 
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2. THE FIRST SEMANTIC NETWORK SYSTEMS 
The essential idea of semantic networks is that the graph-theoretic structure of relations and 
abstractions can be used for inference as well as understanding. Although networks are now used 
for general descriptions, the formal basis was first developed in the last century in an area of 
advanced mathematics needed to solve systems of simultaneous equations. 
In the field of higher algebra, mathematicians such as Cayley and Sylvester in England had 
perceived that certain sets of interrelated equations could best be solved using abstract structures 
which took characteristic shapes of trees and nets of algebraic relations (e.g. invariants and 
'umbrals'). It turned out that the central problem could be solved by analyzing just the structure 
itself, irrespective of the meanings of the relations. This exciting discovery occurred at the 
same time as the early development of 'graph theory' and the discovery of the structure of 
chemical bonds. In 1877, J. J. Sylvester wrote of the startling analogy between higher algebraic 
structures and chemical radicals and molecules, "an untold treasure of hoarded algebraic wealth," 
he claimed [20, 21]. An algebraic relation of three free arguments (such as an irreducible invariant 
of degree three) is like an atom with 'valence' of three unsaturated chemical bonds, and algebraic 
correlation of such relations (using the Jacobian) is like chemical bonding of atoms. The constraint 
on the solutions of the equations is like an abstract molecule. 
P.1. Mathematical Form and Existential Graphs 
Alfred Bray Kempe, the Engfish lawyer famous for his theorem of mechanical linkages and 
his fully, accepted but fallacious proof of the four-color map theorem in topology, and Charles S. 
Peirce, the American philosopher, mathematician, cartographer, philologist, logician, etc., gen- 
eralized Sylvester's treatment of mathematical relational structures to all conceptual structures 
using diagrams of relationships. As far as I know, in modern terminology Kempe and Peirce 
created the first semantic network systems. 
Kempe's "Memoir on the Theory of Mathematical Form" of 1886 [22, 23] describes his diagraxn 
system; like modern ones it used nodes for the conceptual units and lines for the 'distinguished 
pairs' of units. He felt he had discovered a unifying truth underlying all of logic and mathematics: 
regardless of the apparent subject-matter, the true subject-matter of thought is the (group- 
theoretic) structure of the conceptual units. He wrote: 
"My object in this memoir is to separate the necessary matter of exact or mathemat- 
ical thought from the accidental clothing--geometrical, gebraical, ogical &c.--in 
which it is usually presented for consideration; and to indicate wherein consists the 
infinite variety which that necessary matter exhibits." 
Thus Kempe's first concern was to dispense with the particular intended meaning and concentrate 
on the pure structure of the network. In addition to the logic of ordinary assertions he treated a
large part of mathematics by diagram including group theory. 
Although Kempe's Memoir was not widely understood, Peirce was very enthusiastic about 
it and he worked for decades to develop his own concept-diagram system, called Existential  
Graphs [24-26]---see Figure 3. This system includes a two-dimensional graphic version of first- 
order predicate logic with some extensions, and he provided rigorous rules for manipulating the 
diagrams which preserve truth and constitute a system of proof. (A description is in the article 
"The Existential Graphs" by Roberts. 5) He represented individuals by lines and relations by 
nodes, just the opposite of the modern practice. Peirce was the inventor or coinventor of the 
Predicate Calculus 6, the Algebra of Relations, and Lattice Theory; in the course of inventing 
these he developed and used the Existential Graphs, which he always considered the superior 
representation when careful analysis was required. An early topology enthusiast, he attempted 
5When I refer to an article or survey without a citation number it's in this collection. 
eThat is, first-order quantified predicate logic, which was also independently invented earlier by Gottlob Frege 
in a two-dhnensional graphic notation called 'concept-writing' (Begri~schrifl) [27]. Like Peirce, he too preferred 
his graphic (tree-based) language over linear logic notation. His desire to popularize it was defeated by the need 
to accomodate typesetters, to his disgust. 
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- -  rotten 
something 
is rotten 
no man is they also serve who 
an island stand and wait 
stop-sign stopping law 
symbol 
13 
driver 
a stop sign signals driver 
that law requires stopping 
Figure 3. Peirce's Existential Graphs. The thick, sometimes branched, lines 
represent individuals. The junctions labelled with words represent predicates 
or relations. The thin loops represent negation. On the right, the nllmhers 
distinguish the three individuals related by 'symbol'; see text. (The examples 
are mine.) 
to derive metaphysical truths by applying topological and graph-theoretic results to his diagrams. 
This led him to his controversial Reduction Theorem, that all concepts and relations in the world 
can be defined with monads (qualities), dyads (relations between two things), and necessarily 
some triads (relations between three things), but no relations of higher valence [28-31]. 7 Prom 
this in turn he developed the well-known philosophical doctrines of Pragmatism and Pragrnaticism 
and the theory of Semiotics, in all of which he emphasized that there is a fundamental division 
of nature into Firstness (monads), Secondness (entities definable using only monads and dyads) 
and Thirdness (entities definable using monads, dyads and at least one true triad). In Semiotics 
the most famous Thirdness is the sign-relation, wherein a signifier z (e.g. a symbol) represents 
an object y to the 'interpretant' z (e.g. a person)--see the fourth example in Figure 3; failure to 
recognize the essential Thirdness of the sign-relation is deemed a great philosophical error. These 
remain active schools of thought in philosophy. 
Remarkably--considering all that flowed from Peirce's experiments with Existential Graphs-- 
for 70 years after his death in 1914 virtually no one made use of them. s In 1984 they were 
introduced to the AI world in Sowa's book Conceptual Structures [33] as part of CONCEPTUAL 
GRAPHS; see his article in this volume. 9 
~.2. First Use in Computers 
The first semantic network for computers was Nude,  created by R. H. Richens of the Cam- 
bridge Language Research Unit in 1956 as an interlingua for machine translation of natural 
languages. The idea is that instead of a computer translating directly, say from Russian to En- 
glish, it is better to translate first to a 'neutral' conceptual language or interlingua, and then 
from that to the target language. 
"I refer now to the construction of an interlingua in which all the structural peculiari- 
ties of the base language are removed and we are left with what I shall call a 'semantic 
net' of 'naked ideas ' . . . .  The elements represent things, qualities or relations . . . .  
A bond points from a thing to its qualities or relations, or from a quality or relation 
to a further qualification." [34] 
From the start, Richens' Nude system involved the idea of semantic primitives, that is, a 
small core of basic concepts out of which all other concepts could be built [35]. This idea is still 
pursued in several systems (see Section 11). 'The words of Nude are constructed of some fifty 
elements .. .  each of which denotes ome basic idea such as plurality, animal or negation." 
The somewhat unorganized mish-mash of Nude's concepts was soon addressed in the semantic 
network T created by the late Margaret Masterman, leader of the Cambridge Language Research 
rThe essence of the ide~ was noted by Sylvester in 1878 in [21, p. 181] in the Colleete ,I WorkJ, and Ues at the 
heart of currently studied Constraint Sati~_Actlon Problems. 
SA possible exception is G. Spencer Brown, whoso 'fontm' in hill Law~ of Form closely re~m~e Existential 
Graphs [32]. 
9peirce'o Existential Graphs are described in the articles by Roberts and Butch; his Reduction Theorem -~ppe~-~ 
in the articles by Butch and Marty. 
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1 2 dog 1 2 1 2 
, part o f ,  teeth • contact.c cat cat •black cat •on•  mat 
mu~eh 
"black cat" "The cat is on the mat." "The dog bites the cat." 
Figure 4. The original 'sernAnt.~c net'  notation of R. H. Richene' Nude. Num- 
bers identify different items related by a particular elation. 
Unit [36]. She created a thesaurus for organizing the concepts of a language into a hierarchy 
accessible to a computer, based on the classic Roger's Thesaurus which organizes concepts into a 
tree-structured taxonomy of all categories of knowledge. 1° 11 Since one concept may be included 
under more than one higher (more abstract) concept she concluded that concepts are organized 
in a mathematical lattice and not just a tree. The T lattice was the 'product' of constituent 
sub-lattices, including a flexible arrangement of 100 semantic 'minimals' (not necessarily claimed 
to be ultimate primitives) like BAD, COUNT, I, SMELL and WANT. 
The Richens/Masterman semantic primitives were adapted for PREFERENCE SEMANTICS (See 
the survey by Wilks ~ FaNs). Thesaurus research as continued at Cambridge in the work of 
Karen Sparck Jones [37, 38]. Sylvio Ceccato [39] devised similar 'correlative nets' for machine 
translation in the late 1950's and early 60's; they included about fifty link types. Nets as a 
conceptual model were also proposed by Robert K. Lindsay at the University of Texas in 1961 
and by W. R. Reitman [40]. 12 
When the field of AI emerged in the 1960's, semantic networks quickly became important 
(based primarily on Quillian's network program for word meanings---see S ction 11) and they 
have been in the mainstream of AI ever since. Later work in AI includes gains in expressiveness, 
formalization, and efficiency but there have been losses too in that valuable ideas in the early 
systems have remained undeveloped. (In fact the systems described so far were nearly forgotten 
in AI.) Rather than repeat existing coverage of semantic networks equentially beginning with 
the work of Quillian, I refer you to the published surveys cited above in Section 1.3. 
Part II. The Basics 
3. KINDS OF LINKS 
Semantic networks were used in AI for years before they were carefully analyzed. It is usual 
in AI for innovative 'scruffies' to come up with ideas and implement them as working computer 
programs, followed by criticism from 'neats' who decry ill-defined notations and ad hoc methods 
and call for rigorous formalization in logic, set theory and model-theoretic semantics. Is In the 
1960's and 70's, mixtures of different kinds of relation links were used in working semantic network 
systems somewhat indiscriminately; the formalization trend in recent years has largely been an 
10I use "hierarchy" in the broad sense, to mean a partially ordered set or poser, a true lattice, or a tree structure 
with its 'root' at the top. In any of these, one node may outrank another and the order relation is often represented 
by the symbol '~ '  (formally, a reflexive, transitive, and antisymmetric dyadic relation). "Lattice" refers to the 
abstract algebraic structure studied in Lattice Theory (a poser for which any pair of elements a and b has within 
the poser a unique Greatest Lower Bound or meet 'a A b' _~ a and ~ b, and a unique Least Upper Bound or join 
'a v b' _~ a and _~ b), rather than a crystalline or space-filling lattice. 
11Warning: Some books called "Roget's" are alphabetized lists of synonyms with no resemblance to Roget's 
tree-structured taxonomy; others are faithful to Roger's method. 
12In the 1960's, I saw a network language called 'Shum' (in a Shum Foundation publication) created to express 
the fundamental ideas of the great eastern religions; since then I've never found a~y references to Shum. 
13 Model-theoretic semantics specifies the meaning of a proposed language by requiring an inte~"pretation f~nction 
from every syntactically well-formed escription in the language into a formal world which is the set D of objects 
in the domain (universe of discourse). If definable in ordinary logic, a predicate symbol or formula in the language 
(called the intenJion) specifies a certain subset of D (cMled its eztenaion). Similarly, a dyadic relation in the 
language specifies a subset of the pairs in the Cartesian product D × D, and so on. In practice, operators are 
simply translated into statements about D in conventional logic and set theory. Languages not definable in 
ordinary logic have been specified using possible worlds, multiple extensions, worlds 'known' to agents, prioritized 
world-orderings, partial models, fuzzy models, mereology, intultionism and other exotica [41--43]. 
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effort to sort out the meanings of these different link types, e.g. [44--46]. In order to separate and 
analyze the distinct notions involved, Brachman [3] suggested five different levels of nodes and 
links which had been used in semantic networks, from the low-level data locations and pointers 
to the high-level linguistic words and descriptions, as shown in Figure 5. 
LEVEL 
Linguistic 
Conceptual 
'Epist emologlcal' 
(Structural) 
Logical 
Implement ational 
COMPONENTS 
Arbitrary concepts, words, 
expressions 
Semantic or Conceptual Relations 
(cases), primitive objects and actions 
Concept ypes, conceptual sub- 
pieces, inheritance and 
structuring relations 
Propositions, predicates, 
logical operators 
Atoms, pointers 
STRUCTURES 
Sentences, descriptions 
Conceptual Dependencies, 
deep-case semantic nets 
Associative, relational, 
INSTANCE-OF, and 
IS-A l!nlc systems 
Boolean logic nodes, 
'partitions,' negated contexts 
Data structures, frames 
Figure 5. Five levels of nodes and links, based on Brachman's analysis. 
A description using a semantic network can exist at all of these levels simultaneously. Objects 
and relations at each level are realized using structures at a lower level. Examples at all levels 
will be found in the rest of this article and in other articles in this volume. 
At the lowest, implementational level are simple links between data structures. One node- 
unit may contain a direct pointer to another, that is, to its actual or virtual address in machine 
memory or in storage. Special-purpose semantic net machines may use actual wires or other 
hardware paths as links (see Section 14). 
4. FRAME SYSTEMS 
The standard representation f semantic networks in conventional computers uses frames as 
data structures. Figure 6 has a frame for a dog named Fido. A f r -me is a named data object 
(FIDO) I 
Slot 
INSTANCE-OF: 
N~e.  
Color: 
Father: 
Mother: 
Owner: 
Cost:  
H~-aa-ears: 
Nxm~er-of-e~rs: 
Val~es 
value: (DOG, PET) 
value: "Fido" 
value: (BROWN) 
value: BOWSER)  
value: WEENIE) 
value: MR.-FITZCUBBINS) 
value: ~12.95 
value: (LEFT-EAR, RIGHT-EAR) 
value: 2 
Figure 6. A frame for an individual dog is at the left. The name of the frame 
appears at the top and the slots with their values are listed. On the right is a 
network of frame-nodes pointing to one another. 
with a flexible collection of named slots (attributes or fields) which can have va lues)  4 The 
values are often pointers to other frames, which permits you to have a network of frames pointing 
to one another, as in Figure 6. 
Such a f rame sys tem is like a directed graph with labelled vertices and arcs. A frame is 
a node or vertex; each slot is a labelled directed arc pointing to the vertex (frame) whose label 
14Framcm as data structures resernble 'records' in ALGOL, Ads or Pascal, or 'structs' in C, but there is usually no 
fixed number or order of dots; slots are acceued by slot-name. Flexible frames may be combined with fixed-length, 
fixed-order records for speed of access, as in [47]. 
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appears in the slot. Some slots may have simple values which are not other frames: Fido's Cost 
slot has '$12.95' and the Number-of-ears slot has '2.' The value of a slot can be a set of values 
rather than just one; an example is the set of dog's ears in Figure 6. 
Various logic formalizations offrames and semantic networks have been proposed, e.g. [33, 48- 
52]. Frames collect explicit information about an individual object at the node representing that 
object (implicit information is derived from its relations to other nodes in the network). This 
bundling of information with an object is one essential feature of an Object-Oriented system. 
Even logicians hostile to nets admit the value of this for quickly finding information about an 
object [48]. 
Minsky used frames for a psychological theory of recognition and expectation based on stereo- 
types, and he propounded frames for visual and linguistic recognition as well as frames for ex- 
tended narratives (often called 'scripts') and analogies [53]. 15 
In FRL (for Frame Representation Language) [54,55] and KRL (for Knowledge Representa- 
tion Language) [56] the value of a slot can be calculated on the fly rather than stored explicitly, 
using procedural  attachment.  A procedure (program) called a d¢mon is simply 'attached' to 
the slot and is triggered by a request for a value (the IF-NEEDED daemon) or by an addition to 
the slot (the IF-ADDED daemon). If Abdullah, a Muslim, has four women in his Wives lot, 
(ABDULLAH) I 
INSTANCE-OF: (MUSLIM) 
Name: 
Wives" 
Number-of-wives: 
value: "Abdullah" 
value: (FATIMA, MORGANA, BENAZIR, NOOR) 
value: l if-needed: (LENGTH (FGET 'SELF 'WIVES)) 
it is not necessary to store '4' in his Number-of-wives slot; instead an IF-NEEDED daemon 
program in Number-of-wives looks at Wives, counts the entries, and returns the value of the 
count. That way if a wife is removed from Abdullah's Wives lot it is not necessary to update 
his Number-of-wives slot. 
An attached procedure may in general be any arbitrary program in the underlying program- 
ming language (therefore it can completely ignore the frame system). However, if IF-NEEDED 
daemon programs are restricted to look only at values of other frame slots, then they amount 
to rules in a backward-chaining (goal driven) rule-based inference system, since accessing a goal 
slot may trigger a whole cascade of IF-NEEDED slot accesses preading backward in the net. 
Likewise, if IF-ADDED daemons only add values to other frame slots, they amount o rules in a 
forward-chaining (data driven) rule-based inference system. Procedural attachment is developed 
further in the PSN (Procedural Semantic Network) family of research summarized by Mylopoulos 
in this volume. 
A slot can in turn have facets, including 'value' for the explicit value itself, 'default-value' 
used only in case there is no 'value,' or 'if-needed' indicating that a daemon program returns a 
value as a result of calculation. Other facets include 'range-restriction' such as 25-500 for a 
Number-of-Employees slot or a 'type-restr ict ion' such as that Fathers must be Males. 
A full LISP implementation f a frame system is in Chapter 22 of the first edition of Winston & 
Horn's textbook LISP [57]; 16 these frames are also introduced in [58]. Frames are now used in 
all kinds of applications, from structured Computer Aided Design (CAD) systems [59, 60], to 
virtually any 'object-oriented' program. Full-featured frame systems uitable for implementing 
semantic networks are available commercially, such as KEE, Nexpert Object, and others. For 
details see [61] and Section 15 below. 
15To recognize an object, some of the object's (directly perceived) features are used to retrieve from memory an 
applicable frame with the same features as slot values; this then triggers the default expectation that other features 
will have the values provided by the frame's remaining slots. This of course assumes the utility of stereotypes. 
Minsky argued that some similar process must take place in human thought. If you mention a birthday party to a 
child, what the child thinks of is not the formal definition "a group assembled to celebrate a birthday," but rather 
a bunch of expected things none of which is essential to the definition, such as birthday cake, games etc. These 
are default ~alue8 for the FOOD slot, ACTIVITY slot, and so on of the BIRTHDAY-PARTY frame. 
leThe recent edition has abandoned custom-built frames in favor of using CLOS, the Common LISP Object 
System, which is a built-in object-oriented package often provided with Common LISP. 
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5. RELATIONAL GRAPHS 
A simple statement about individuals is a relational graph; the nodes represent existing 
entities in the described world, and links represent relations asserted to hold between them. 
These are sometimes called assertional or descriptive links as opposed to the 'structural,' 
'definitional' or 'inferential' links described later in Section 6. In Figure 1 the relational grsph is 
the heavy-lined graph describing Toby and his mother. 
5.1. Semantic Case Relations 
For ordinary descriptions, most semantic nets have 'case links.' The idea of case comes from 
grammar. 'Nominative case,' 'dative case,' etc. describe the syntactic relations in a sentence 
b.etween the verb and the nouns. English indicates this with word order (e.g. the nominative 
noun comes before the verb) or prepositions (as in "I was going to St. Ives"), Latin with various 
suiftxes. These syntactic cases on the surface represent deeper 'semantic cases.' A semantic case 
specifies the real-world role played by the n.oun in the event (represented in a semantic net by 
a case-relatlon llnk). The nominative noun is the ACTOR in "Moe hit Curly" but in "Curly 
received blows from Moe" the nominative "Curly" is obviously not the ACTOR but is now the 
OBJECT of the hitting action. 
I ACTOR: 
OBJECT: 
INSTRUMENT: 
i UNDER: 
BENEFICIARY: 
AT-TIME: 
type: ~ ~mt 
type: p~mm or 
type: movie t l~  
type: object or event in space 
type: ~ e  ~ ,  ~ o r  
type: tame point or ~a 'va l  
Figure 7. A possible deep case net for "Under the bridge, PFC I.~roy Jones 
attacked the tank with a hand grenade at 02.'G0 hours for the Sa'udls." The 
links are labelled as semantic ases. A possible cue-frame for "attack" is shown 
on the right. 
In Figure 7 the ACTOR case links the action (attacking) to some animate causal agent, 
OBJECT (sometimes called THEME or PATIENT) points to the thing mainly affected by it, 
INSTRUMENT points to something purposely affected by the ACTOR which further affects 
the OBJECT, UNDER points to a physical object or event physically above it, BENEFICIARY 
points to the person or cause served, and AT-TIME points to its time of occurrence. Each case 
has a type restr ict ion on the type of object which may occupy that case position; for example, 
ACTOR must link to an animate agent. A frame (as described in the last Section) representing 
an event and its cases, together with these type restrictions on the related objects, is called a 
case f rame or sometimes a schema. 
Early Case Grammar theorists tayed fairly close to surface grammar with small sets of deep 
cases [62]; 17 however, the link types in Figure 7 are quite disparate and each one suggests a
whole family of related types: UNDER, for example, is one of an indefinite number of possible 
physical relationships between objects or events, is A core set of deep case relations corresponds 
17Fillmore [63] said there are really six cases and Celce-Murcia [64] used only the following five: CAUSAL- 
ACTANT, THEME (also called OBJECT),  LOCUS, SOURCE and GOAL. Simmo~m [65] used a version of this 
list for processing English sentences; the only use of the c.~ses was to obtain an ,mamh~uous parse of a sentence 
and fine distinctions were ignored. Humelhart & Norman [66] tried to provide necessary and sutBdent conditions 
for their own list of cases. Schank's CONCEPTUAL DEPENDENCY theory used five case-lllm relation primitives; see 
the survey by Lytinen. Wilks' PREFERENCE SEMANTICS uses 21 case primitives; see the survey by W~ & l~ms. 
More receatly Sparck Jones & Boguraev [38] list 28 deep cases bued on dict|onsry and thesaurus studies. 
lSThe full repertoire of spatial prepositio~m (film UNDER) in nstural  snKuage is complicsted and vm'ies from 
culture to culture. Careful m~dysis d the physical mennin K of these prepesittous i a hal lmm~ of cogmflive 
ling~i#ties [67,68]. Since mint  traditional case relations c~mect a pr i~  ~em~ozel action to ~ spe~/al 
objects or places, they are vertical llnk. in the 'canonical ,qua~' in Hartley's article "A Unlfoml l~presemation 
for Time and Space and their Mutual Constraints." Parunak [69] notes a corresponding altc~mtion between 
verb-nodes and noun-nodes in paths through a sema~ic net. 
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to Aristotle's idea of a finite list of fundamental categorical ccidents; these determine the why, 
when, where, etc. of a thing or event. 
5.2. Assertional Links and Beyond 
Case-relation links are examples of the assertional links which may occur in a relational 
graph. Some other assertional links are parts of real-world systems of relations which enable 
specialized inferences due to those systems' inherent structures. For example, reasoning about 
kinship links like MOTHER-OF  and SISTER-OF can take advantage of the existing structural 
features of ancestry and descent in a system of family trees [70]: two joined MOTHER-OF  
links automatically imply a GRANDMOTHER-OF  link. The connectivity of a semantic net 
/ / I  
i 
A 
c 
P.~mmple 
Non~Y=mpl© 
ONE-PA~T-~S 
G'~OUP-OF ~ ~ ] MO DIFICATIO'~I'OF 
kOR'ENTAT'O~L L ' R,GHT-OF'~--~J W 0 
~ . ~  --A-KIND-OF ~ 
Figure 8. On the left are line drawings of an example and a non-example of
a 'block-arch.' Winston's emantic net for the 'block-arch' concept is on the 
fight. 
pattern can mimic the connectivity of a physical system, such as the parts of the body [71] 
or the bounding edges and surfaces of a manufactured part [72]. Time relations like BEFORE 
and DURING and space relations like INSIDE can make use of topological order structure. Is 
Winston [58, 73] included physical positional relations in his early semantic network for vision 
processing. Relations like ABOVE or SUPPORTED-BY  describe arrangements of toy blocks in 
a program designed to recognize and learn structural concepts like BLOCK-ARCH from examples 
of line drawings of the blocks; see Figure 8. The program tries to discern abstract commonalities 
among the examples of a certain block structure which are lacking in the non-examples, in order 
to learn the structure's essential concept. For this reason his diagram of the learned structure of 
the BLOCK-ARCH concept, shown in Figure 8, has definitional and abstract links in addition to 
the simple assertional ones. This mixture of link types ignited great interest and reaction in the 
AI field. 
In Figure 8 there is, along with the assertional physical-relation links, a whole zoo of new 
objects and relations. There are new things called properties as well as a set (the unlabelled 
circle). A -K IND-OF  links can apply to objects like BLOCKS and to relations like LEFT-OF.  
MUST indicates a definitional condition and NOT is of course logical. The higher-order relation 
between LEFT-OF  and R IGHT-OF  presumably means OPPOSITE-OF.  These abstractions were 
successfully used to classify the arrangements of blocks. They are also needed in most other kinds 
of human reasoning besides visual recognition. 
19See R&ndell ~ Cohn's article "Exploiting Lattices in a Theory of Space and Time." 
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5.3. Valence of Relations and Links 
The valence (or arity or adicity) of a relation is the number of items or 'arguments' related. 
Boring(Paris) is monadic or unary (i.e. a quality, property or predicate); Mother-of(Mary, Jesus) 
is dyadic or binary; Between(Andorra,France,Spain) is triadic or ternary; R(Zl , . . . ,  zn) is n-adic 
or n-ary; etc. 
A semantic network link represents a dyadic relation between the two nodes connected by that 
link but (since every arc in a graph is just a pair of vertices) there is no built-in representation 
for higher-valence r lations. One way to link the three nodes joined by a triadic relation is to 
introduce a new node representing the triadic relation itself as an 'object' with labelled dyadic 
links to all its arguments (i.e. it becomes the center of a 'star' of links). This is recommended by 
Levesque & Brachman [74]. The sentence "John's grade is 85 in course no. 100" relates John, the 
mark of 85, and the course. Instead of using a true triadic relation like GradeOohn , courselO0, 
85), they create a 'grade-assignment' object 2° g-al  and put the following in the knowledge base: 
Grade-assignment(g-al) A Student(g-al,john) ^ Course(g-al,courselO0) ^ Mark(g-al,85). 
In "Operations on Nets" in this volume, Boley illustrates and criticizes this approach and 
recommends using true hypergraphs to represent relations. A hypergraph unlike a graph may 
have pairs, triples, quadruples etc. of vertices as n-ended hyperarcs instead of just two-ended arcs 
(e.g. item 1 in Figure 13). 21 
Many semantic nets and frame systems also artificially 'dyadize' monadic qualities using a 
dyadic relation link. Instead of the simple Paris-.BORING, "Paris is boring" is rendered as 
Paris-,ATTRIBUTE~Boring, or Paris--*INTERESTINGNESS~Low, or Paris--*IS-A~Boring- 
Thing, or Paris---*BORING--*True. 
To Peirce, relational valence was the be-all and end-all; in his long search for the true 'cat- 
egories' (in the classic Aristotelian/Kantian sense), he kept returning to Firstness, Secondness 
and especially Thirdness, described in Section 2.1., as the ultimate ones on which his philosophy 
was based. 22 Even some ardent admirers of Peirce doubt that valence offers a crucial trisection 
of life, e.g. [80, 81], but others are full of the spirit [28, 82]. 
Aside from any philosophical interest, the important but computationally intractable task 
of graph comparison (subgraph isomorphism testing) of semantic nets becomes tractable if the 
compared graphs are in at-most-trivalent form [83]. 2s 
6. ABSTRACTION HIERARCHIES,  IS-A, AND INHERITANCE 
The great organizing principle of thought is abstraction. By assigning particular things to 
abstract categories we are able to dispense with irrelevant detail and yet instantly draw copious 
2°This is an example of what Peirce called 'hypc~tatic abstraction' in which new concepts are introduced to 
represent relations and qualities of others. He vigorously defended the practice, which had been hmapooned 
in a play of Meli~re's wherein learned doctors declare that the reason opium causes sleep is that opium has a 
'dormative virtue.' Treating relations as individuals has been criticized because it leads to infinite regress: if 
Va, b(3z = R[R(a,b)) is permissible, then 3y = R']R'(a,x), and 3z = R"[R"(a,y) and so on. 
21Sc-hmolze [75] extends KL-ONE's dyadic roles to include n-adic relations. In CONCEPTUAL GRAPHS there's no 
good reason why the relation-nodes could not be of any valence. General directed set systems (like the 'relational 
structures' of Ad~mek [Tf~ or in Universal Algebra [77]) can be treated as bipartite directed hy -~aphs  (with one 
kind of hyperarc for an individual and another for an n-adic relation), which elucidates the quasi-duality between 
a relation relating several individuals and an individual participating in, and thereby relating, several relations. 
Vertices in such a hypergraph are neither individuals nor qualities nor general relations--they are 'tropes' [78]. A 
trope is a particular predication of a particular individual, e.g. Socrates' being wise (For monadic predication o~ly, 
a trope is an element of I in a 'Concept Lattice' (G, M, I) in Wille's article). Some say tropes are the ftmdAm,~ntal 
ontologic~ entities, not individuals or qualities [79]. 
2~The formal reason for this is the Reduction Theorem described in the articles "Peircean Algebr~dc Logic" by 
Butch and ~'Foliated Semantic Networks"by Marty; its philosophical import is explained simply in Peirce'slettere 
to  Lady Welby [31]. 
2s "Tractable" refers to formal camputational complexity theory and usually me~tw dug as the n ,~er  n of items 
conv ic ted  increases, the time it takes in the worst case to compute an answer ~ at moet palynomialiy {say, 
as n s increases), and not exponentially (say, as 3 n increases). A formally intram-table algorithm with expanenti~dly 
increasing time is considered isastrous ince it generally means a computer would take cents-lee to process 
a practical-sized problem. Certain problems called 'NP' are believed to be intractable, although this has not  
actually been proven. 
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conclusions about a thing due to its membership in various categories. Semantic networks spec- 
ify the structure of interrelated abstract categories and use this structure to draw conclusions. 
They have "type lattices," "taxonomies," "thesauri," "generalization hierarchies," "inheritance 
hierarchies," "subsumption posets," "sort lattices," etc. as inferential structures. 24 These hier- 
archies can be used for many purposes such as: 'inheritance' of qualities by one class from a 
superclass, calculating a 'semantic distance' between two concepts, guiding and simplifying au- 
tomatic theorem-proving, classifying described objects, recognizing valid analogies, finding facts 
in a database, generating procedural programs, and other computational tasks. 
There are three possible sources of hierarchy structure all of which are represented in this 
volume; 
1. The designer decides which concepts fall under which and supplies all the links directly by 
hand. That is most common in AI and in the general history of taxonomy. 
2. The concept hierarchy structure is induced (or automatically generated) by some other 
formal structure. For example, a KL-ONE-style terminological subsumption hierarchy au- 
tomatically gets its hierarchy structure as a function of the formal concept definitions. 26
3. The concept hierarchy may emerge directly from the statistical characteristics of a set of 
data. 26 
6.1. IS-A and INSTANCE-OF Links 
Many semantic networks implement abstraction hierarchies using IS-A links (Winston's A- 
K IND-OF  links) from subconcepts to superconcepts. In Figure 9, DOG IS-A MAMMAL,  SO if a 
MAMMAL has hair then any individual Do(~ inherits the quality of having hair from MAMMAL.  
The IS-A link is different from the assertional links discussed so far because it does not assert any 
particular relation between individuals in the world being described; rather it states a (usually 
timeless) abstract relationship between two concepts. (This is a bit like the distinction in Spanish 
between ser and estar.) It is now recognized that several different links used for inference have 
been called "IS-A" [45]. The first distinction to be made is between INSTANCE-OF  and IS-A. 
In Figure 9 a certain dog "Fido" is an INSTANCE-OF  DoG, but DOG IS-A MAMMAL.  This is 
the difference between an individual being a member of a class, and a class being a subclass of 
another class. In the ordinary strict logical interpretation, INSTANCE-OF  means E and IS-A 
means C. Unlike IS-A, INSTANCE-OF  is not transitive; Fido is an INSTANCE-OF  DoG and 
DOG is an INSTANCE-OF  SPECIES but Fido is not an INSTANCE-OF  SPECIES. 
The notion of inheritance of features (qualities, facts or procedures) from a higher concept 
is very powerful practically, because it allows you to store a feature at the highest possible level 
of abstraction achieving the max imum elegance and economy of storage; all lower concepts have 
automatic access to the feature. Much has been written about inheritance, e.g. [45, 46,100,101], 
and it is well covered in the articles in this volume. Knowledge engineers usually hand-create 
24Speculating, I surmise that an analogue of some such structure exists in the circuitry of the brain. It seems 
that we recognize inclusion of one concept within another without much mental effort, and certainly with no sense 
of searching through a space of possibilities. 
2SOne term is subsumed by another, more general term if anything described by the first is necessarily also 
described by the second. It is terminologically subsumed if this is solely due to the terms' fully expanded definitions 
in a 'terminology' or formal dictionary: the definition "a lazy man" terminologically subsumaes the definition "a 
lazy, happy father" if "father" is further defined as "a man with children." See the KL -ONE survey by Woods  
Schmolze. The full generalization hierarchy of CONCEPTUAL GRAPHS is similarly generated; see the survey 
by Sowa. The OMEGA language for formal descriptions [84] induces a lattice of terms and expressions. Many  
hierarchies are related to other mathematical structures such as lattices of topological inclusion, intervals, set 
partitions, etc. 
28The statistical examples in Wille's article on 'Concept Latticca' are of this kind, and there is a large body of 
relevant work on statistical data analysis and cluster-based pattern recognition, e.g. [85-90]. Russian taxonomic 
classification and 'meronomy' theory [91-96] derives a taxonomy from objects' attributes and relations using 
lattices imilar to Wiile's. Some Case-Baaed Reasoning systems generate a hierarchy of case-generalizations based 
on  the common features of previous cases or occurrences [97-99]. In Levinson's article "Pattern Associativity and 
the Retrieval of Semantic Networks" a hierarchy is built up based on the purely structural features of previously 
encountered nets. 
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/ -~ j l~ .  ~ R.YING-TXING 
PRIVATE-PROPERTY MAMMAL B IRD CRUISE-MISSILE 
WRITING-DESK DOG CAT PERSON RAVEN PENGUIN 
IN~ ~NST [,NST I INS]" IINST IINST 
Fido Weenle Shadow I.snore x Tweety 
INST 
ALCM#R810 
Figure 9. An IS-A hierarchy with various features discussed in the text. Fido is 
an instance of DoG, and inherits the qualities of DoG and all the superdasses 
of DOG. The mathematical structure is a poset. 
IS-A hierarchies hoping to maximize the amount of inherited (common) information. The subject 
of inheritance is clarified in the formal 'concept lattices' in Wille's article: the higher the concept, 
the more objects described, but the fewer attributes inherited. 
IS-A may refer to just necessary conditions or to the necessary and sufficient conditions to 
determine that something must be in an instance of the concept by definition. Natural taxonomies 
allow merely necessary IS-A links--in Figure 9, we know DOG is a MAMMAL but we don't know 
what else it takes to be a dog. Generally, inheritance needs only the merely necessary IS-A 
link, whereas automatic lassification of described objects needs both necessary and sufficient 
conditions in order to determine automatically the proper location of a new concept description 
in the existing concept hierarchyY 
The recent trend is that the inferential IS-A structure relating abstract concepts is kept 
separate from the assertional structures relating individuals in the world (i.e. the relational 
graphs described earlier). In what are called hybr id systems, there are separate sub-systems 
(often called 'BOXES') for assertional structures and inferential structures; each uses its own 
reasoning algorithms [102]. IS-A links are not mixed in with the asserted relational links. 2s 
6.2. Multiple and De feasible Inheritance 
6.2.1. Single vs. Multiple Inheritance 
Many inheritance structures are trees. In a tree (usually pictured spreading down, with the 
root at the top) each node has only one node immediately above it (its 'parent node') from which 
it may inherit; this is called single inheritance. However, in most IS-A hierarchies in AI a node 
may have multiple parent nodes and can inherit qualities through multiple paths. In Figure 9, 
DOG is both a CARNIVORE and a PET. This is called multiple inheritance and the structure is 
sometimes called a 'tangled hierarchy' or a 'heterarchy' as opposed to a tree. Mathematically it 
is a partially ordered set (poset). If values in one slot are inherited from multiple superconcepts 
they may be combined by union, as when FIGHTER-BOMBER inherits guns (from FIGHTER) and 
bombs (from BOMBER) in its WEAPONS slot. Or, information inherited from two different 
2rAI systea~m dither on this point. KL-ONF--style terminological languagca use strict definitions which are both 
necessary and sufficient, so they can a~atom~ically claeaiflj new objects according to their formal descriptions, and 
any tmditferentlated concepts are fused (except undefined primitives}; see the survey by Woods & Schmotze. The 
article "Prototypes in a Hybrid Lnaaguage with Primitive Descriptions" by Franconl, Mngnini & Stock deals with 
these questions and extends classification to non-strict IS-A links. 
2SSome new developments are blurring the distinction between inferential and asse~ional links. Many of the 
latter (such ns PART-OF llnka representin& the Pma.-Whole relation) involve partial orders which can be used for 
some inferences. The article "A Model of Hierarchies Based on Gr~ Hmnmnorph~-rnnn by Mill & Rada mentions 
other non-IS-A link~ along which parts of relational graphs ms~ 'slide' as in IS-A inheritance. The article on 
"QUEST" by Graesser, Gordon & Bralnerd combines everal differ~mt hierarchies such as a goal hiera~.hy, c~usal 
hierm~hy, IS-A hierarchy, PART-OF hierarchy, etc. See also [103], Section 6.3. below, and McCalla, Greer, Barrie 
& Pospisil's article "Granularity Hierarchies." 
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superconcepts may conflict. If the conflicting information is inherited strictly, say "HEIGHT-6 
feet" from one superconcept and "HEIGHT-4 feet" from another, it is a simply a prohibited 
contradiction, a mistake in the set of definitions. 
6.~.2. Strict vs. Defeasible Inheritance 
In the strict inheritance just mentioned, the IS-A link amounts to set inclusion or logical 
implication; A IS-A B means A C B or Vz(A(z) :=~ B(z)). Instances of a subconcept must 
have all the features inherited from all the superconcepts. (Strict inheritance is a matter of 
storing information efficiently--the inherited information could just as easily be duplicated at 
every sub-concept without changing the formal semantics.) 
Many inheritance systems allow non-strict defeasible inheritance or inheritance with ex- 
ceptions. In defeasible inheritance something may override (or defeat) the inheriting of a quality 
KEY:  ; : ; :  " . . . .  
IS-A IS-NOT-A INHERITANCE I 
FLYER FLYER ,.. 
BIRD.~ ~ BIRD.---~ ~',  't 
! 
! 
# 
I 
Tweety "l'weety 
FLYER FLYER" '' 
BIRD "--'~ t BIRD-=-'~ t ""  
1 NONFLYER 1~ NONFLYER . X 
PENQUJN.---J PE.aUIN---  ; , 
1 7 T NONFLYER ~'-/# ~" 
Tweety ~ TweeIy 
a. b. c. d. 
Figure 10. Defeasible Inheritance: a. Tweety is a bird and birds fly. b. Tweety 
inherits flying, c. Tweety is a penguin, a penguin is a bird, birds fly, but 
penguins don't fly. d. Tweety inherits not flying. The X means inheritance is
blocked. 
or relation from a higher nodefl 9 See Figure 10. In the most common AI example, suppose 
"BIRDs fly" and Tweety IS-A BIRD. 3° You can conclude: Tweety flies. Then suppose Tweety 
IS-A PENGUIN, PENGUIN IS-A BIRD, and PENGUINS do not fly. Birds still fly, but penguins, 
which are birds, don't. Does Tweety fly or not? In defeasible inheritance this is not a prohibited 
conflict: PENGUIN is an ezception and the more specific information for PENGUIN overrides the 
information for BIRD: Tweety doesn't fly. 
The 'flying' of birds is a default quality, one which is assumed to be true but is not logically 
necessary for every bird. (Default values for slots were discussed in Section 4 on Frames.) This 
is needed because in fact almost all statements in the real world do have exceptions. Dogs have 
four legs, yes, but there are three-legged ogs. There are polite New Yorkers. The few statements 
without exceptions tend to occur in logic and mathematics and in some dictionary definitions (a 
"bachelor" is always unmarried). In the massive Cyc knowledge base (Section 8.1) only about 
five percent of the assertions are strict [104]. 31 
29A subconcept may also restrict a superconcept's attr ibute range, e.g. PERSON AGE -- 0-115 hut SOLDIER 
AGE -- 18-35 where SOLDIER IS-A PERSON, 
3°Here I ignore the distinction between IS-A and INSTANCE-OF. 
alDefeaaible inheritance is an example of 'nonmonotonic' reasoning, so-called because the set of true proposi- 
tions does not always (monotonically) increase as assertions are added, since some propositions may have to be 
retracted in light of new, overriding information. This field includes various related ideas in AI such as McCarthy's 
circumscription, McDermott & Doyle's nonmonotonic logic, Reiter's defattlt logic, Moore's autoepistemic logic, 
various belief re~ision theories, Pearl's probabillstic epsilon inheritance, and inheritance ~heories with defeasible 
links described in Thomason's survey in this volume. These rather technical theories eek, and sometimes claim, 
to "capture our intuitions" but none has attained a consensus of support - - the research community is in a state 
of confusion. Most of these approaches are also impractical for computers at present, due either to formal in- 
tractabil ity or to the need to check the entire knowledge base for possible override of every defeasible inference, 
C/vq~ 23:2 .5 .B  # 
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6.~.3. The Perplezing Combination 
The big problem is when you try to combine multiple inheritance with defeasible inheritance. 
For defeasible inheritance in a single-inheritance tree structure you can conveniently let infor- 
mation in a lower, more specific node override information in any higher nodes. In multiple 
inheritance it is often unclear which nodes override which; sometimes two parent nodes will ap- 
pear to override ach other. In the notorious 'Nixon Diamond' example, Nixon IS-A I~PUBLICAN; 
Nixon IS-A QUAKe.R; normally a QUAK~.R IS-A PACIFIST; normally a 
PACIFIST j , , ,  
REPUBLICAN QUAKER , , , /  
Nlxon 
The Nixon Diamond 
REPUBLICAN IS-NOT-A PACIFIST; is Nixon a PACIFIST or not? This 
has generated a tremendous amount of controversy and research along 
with many a PhD. award. Instead of explaining it here, I refer you 
to the articles by Thomason, Nado & Fikes, Padgham, and Hautam~iki 
which deal with the subject. Keep in mind that the problem 'diamond' 
structure is not limited to a few amusing examples but rather is present 
in most real-world situations requiring thoughtful analysis. 32 
6.3. Relational Inheritance Hierarchies 
Just as concepts form an abstraction hierarchy, relations (links) also have their own abstraction 
hierarchy which can be used for inference. In Figure 1, 'parent,' considered as a relation, is a 
sub-relation of the 'kin' relation. Compared with concept hierarchies, relational hierarchies got 
little attention in AI until recently. 
Real-world relational hierarchies have been derived in natural anguage studies [17]. Chaflin & 
Herrmann [113,114] develop a taxonomy of 31 relations based on relational primitive components 
(elicited from psychological studies). The main subdivisions are: Contrasts, Sirrfilars, Inclusions, 
Case-Relations and Part-Wholes. See also [115]. 33 
Huhns & Stephens [120, 121] propose an algebra for formally composing some familiar rela- 
tions like componentO.f, caesedBy, attributeOf, isA, subprocessOf, etc. and inferring a composite 
relation based on certain higher-order qualities of its ingredients. For example, in Figure 11 
you can plausibly infer (not necessarily logically deduce) that the Wheel  is ownedBy Grover, 
from the facts that the Wheel  is a partOf a Car oumedBy Grover. They use ten higher-order 
qualities of a relation, such as Composable, Homeomerous (having identical range and domain), 
Separable (wheel can be separated from car but not aluminum from wheel), etc., in formally 
deriving a transitivity table for composing the relations. This theory is the basis for specialized 
'transfers-Through' inference rules in the Cyc project (Section 8.1). 
A similar 'path algebra' for composite links is used by the semantic net group at the University 
of Twente [122] to combine IS-A, PART-OF and CAUSAL links. In [123], adjacency matrix op- 
erations for link composition allow you to derive "F-27-CAN--.FIy" from "F-27-1SA-~Aircraft- 
H AS --,Wings-CAS--,Fly." 
or both [41,105-111]. 
32Many proposed AI solutions are would-be J1tbmtitatee for deep analysis. Every nonfrivolous appellate legal case 
has a 'Nixon Diamond' at its core, which is not solved with notational manipulation, model-theoretic ranking, nor 
very often a guess based on probabilities. Defeaaible descriptions are p~agmatic and approximate. When a formal 
approximate description is inadequate for analysis, the system should shift focus to the needed underlying (more 
precise) information if it's av, dl,J~le in the knowledge base. If not, a reaaonable answer ought to be recoverabie 
bemed on some principles by which the approximAtlon waa made in the first place (namely that certain imno~ant 
relations were preserved in the approximation). The idea, now vague, in C1e of reeolving conflicting defmdte by 
analy~ing competing =~nte~ts (Section 8.1, [104,112]) ahows some promiae, but to reeolve a 'diamond' thexe 
will have to be a rich enough knowledge base available to ana~ver deeper questlol~ like "Why, c~" in what way, are 
Republicans not pacifists?" 
33The article "Beyond Im-a and Part-Whole" by Markowit=, Nutter & Evem in this volume describes a 
part of s large relational hlerarcJ~. The KL-ONS propoeal [3] mentioned iltter-role i#lteritanee, but except in 
NIKL [116,117], ~KLONE [118] and NA~5"-KANDOR [75] this has been largely undeveloped by the KL-ON~- 
community. "Sulmumption Computed Algebraically" by B~ & Schmidt in this volume analyzes the interaction 
of the el~m/concept hierarchy and the relation hierarchy. Tottretzky [46] has a chapter on (defeaeible) relational 
inlmritance, and this work is now being advanced by Thomu~ [17.9]; see his article in this volume. 
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Figure 11. Composition of relations. The 'hypotenuse' r lation is derived by 
composing the other two. If all three are the same, the relation is transitive. 
Some frame systems use slot inheritance in which a slot (relation) inherits certain features 
from its slot type (indicated by a 'slot-type' facet in the slot). There is a special slot-frame 
for each slot type (to control the use of slots of that type), and inheritance within the class of 
slot-frames occurs in a separate slot-frame IS-A hierarchy. For example, the slot-f~ame for a 
HE IGHT slot might inherit things like units of linear measurement, spatial constraints, etc. from 
a more general SIZE slot-frame, which would also be inherited by WIDTH and DEPTH slots. 34 
7. LOGICAL  EXTENSIONS:  BL IPS  & BLOBS 
Semantic networks as described so far lack the full expressive power of predicate logic. There is 
no simple way of expressing negation ("Soldiers NOT Volunteering" or "There are NO Unicorns"), 
disjunction ("Persons Born In Britain OR Descended From Britons"), or the universal quantifier 
("ALL Assigned Targets were Destroyed"). Asserted graphs are just existentially quantified 
conjunctions of asserted relations, with IS-A links alone involving implication. Semantic networks 
with these shortcomings are expressively inferior not only to logic but to all natural languages. 
There have been several extensions to semantic networks to correct this. 
Negation with IS-NOT-A links, as in Figures 2 and 10, is very limited because the scope of 
the negation includes only a single node at each end, and this method has not been defined to 
allow nesting of negations, as in double negation for example. Arbitrary scoping and nesting are 
needed--a facility provided in symbolic logic by parentheses. 
Hendrix [127] extended semantic networks by 'partitioning' them into spaces. See Figure 12. 
In net diagrams, spaces are like the overlapping capsules in what are now called Venn Diagrams. 
A space is any subset of the set of nodes and links, so spaces can overlap arbitrarily and a node 
or link can be in more than one space. A partitioning of the network is implemented as a list 
for each space of the nodes and links contained in it, and each node or link has a list of the 
spaces it is in (this requires a lot of storage). To achieve the full power of logic there are special 
logical-connective nodes (labelled as conjunction, disjunction, implication, etc.) which are linked 
directly to spaces, and implication nodes are deemed to have universally quantified antecedents. 
The spaces determine the scope of the connectives. In Figure 12 the assertional or 'scratch' part 
of the net has two spaces in it, which are the antecedent and consequence, respectively, of an 
implication-node. The antecedent MAN is universally quantified. 
Boley's article "Operations on Nets" in this volume similarly encapsulates a part of a semantic 
hypergraph and treats it as a unit. The same is done for sets in Harel's H iGraph  hypergraph 
system [128] (see Figure 13) which uses overlapping set capsules or 'blobs' to indicate inclusion 
of a node in multiple sets. The purpose is to combine interlocking classes with n-adic relations 
without over-complicating the diagram. As with Euler Circles, the inclusion of one blob inside 
another indicates that it is a subset. In theory, IS-A links between classes can be dispensed with; 
instead, a system of nested and overlapping blobs (for a tree structure, nested only) represents 
the hierarchy of classes. Figure 13 shows the use of hypergraph arrows for relations and blobs 
for sets. There is a special notation for Cartesian product using a dashed line to divide a blob. 
~41.,enat's AM/EURISKO, RLL and Cyc projects (Section 8.1) [124-126] have used this method; see also "Saying 
More with Frames: Slots as Classes" by Nado & Fikes in this volume. 
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Scratch 
Figure 12. Her&ix’s ‘partitioned’ semantic network meaning “Every man 
owns a car.” Each e means INSTANCEOF, agt and obj are the AGENT 
and OBJECT case-relations, ante and conae are the antecedent and cons.+ 
quence of the logical implication I, and P is the main predicate ‘owns.’ Any- 
thing in the ante space is considered to have the universai quantifier ‘every’: 
Vm(Men(m) j Men(m) A Owningr(P) A Automobiler(c) A P(m, c)). 
A 
L. 
0 p : I m 0 Q t E x:v mJ 
Figure 13. HiGraphs. 1. Two representations of a hypergraph with some 
2- and Sended hyperarcs. 2. The Cartesian product notation, in this csse 
X x Y with (PA Q) E X and E C_ Y where. A means exchrsivcor. 3. The 
complete digraph on three vertices requires nine arrows; the HiGraph for the 
same system appears below it, needing only one arrow. 4. A HiGraph for a 
complicated system, inchrding directed-hypergraph arrows. 
Part 3 of the Figure shows how numerous relation arrows between individuals may be represented 
by a few arrows (in this example just one) joining blobs; the improvement is more dramatic the 
larger the graph is.35 
CONCEPTUAL GRAPHS (see Sowa’s summary) use a different system of nesied contezts de- 
rived originally from the nested negations in Peirce’s Existential Graphs. All connectives and 
quantifiers in logic can be handled by adding nested negation capsules to the existing implicit 
conjunction and existential quantification, so there’s no need for special nodes for conjunction, 
disjunction, implication, equivalence or any other connectives, nor for a universal quantifier. All 
the logical connectives are definable with NOT and AND-among other possibilities-and VzP(z) 
is definable as ~(3t+(z)). The negation capsules are nestable but cannot overlap. This is the 
35Esch [129] points out that Conceptual Graphs diagrams may be combined with HiGraphs. HiGraph capsules 
m(4y be drawn in the same plane amund the concept nodes to represent dass memberships, in order to augment 
or replace the usual ‘type lattice’ used in Conceptual Graphs. 
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most elegant treatment of logic in semantic nets. a6 In the following surveys of ECO, SNEPS 
and PATH-BASED INHERITANCE, a net may have special nodes representing logical connectives 
or in some cases quantifiers. Automatic deduction using all of predicate logic is inherently in- 
tractable, so most KL-ONE systems have eschewed full first-order predicate logic in an attempt o 
make calculating subsumption tractable. Woods [130] describes various combinations of logical 
quantifiers in KL-ONF.-style definitions. 
A v iv id  knowledge base [131,132] is one in which scoped negation, disjunction, universal 
quantification and functions are deliberately curtailed or eliminated. The knowledge base is a 
conjunction of true propositions containing existing objects and conjoined predicates and rela- 
tions (this is just how the 'model' in model-theoretic semantics is described). Vividness was 
proposed by Levesque as a way to achieve tractability while retaining useful expressions and in- 
ference methods. Negatives are rarely used in ordinary life outside the specification of rules ("No 
smoking") or the defeat of a default expectation ( "Cats with no tails"). There are too many neg- 
ative facts--fully describing what's on a table may take a long time, but inventorying what's not 
on it will take forever. Also, arbitrary disjunctions like 'DOCTOR OR DEBENTURE'  are almost 
never used, as opposed to approximate categories in a hierarchy like HEALTH-PROFESSIONAL 
- 'DOCTOR OR DENTIST'  or interval tolerances like DIAMETER = 42mm 4- 0.Smm. 37 Psy- 
chological studies show that people handle vivid information most easily [133]. A good vivid 
knowledge representation is simply the classic unextended semantic network. 
Par t  I I I .  Wor ld -S t ructur ing  Systems 
"These ambiguities, redundancies and deficiencies recall those attributed by 
Dr. Franz Kuhn to a certain Chinese encyclopaedia entitled Celestial Emporium of 
Benevolent Knowledge. On those remote pages it is written that animals are divided 
into (a) those that belong to the Emperor, (b) embalmed ones, (c) those that are 
trained, (d) suckling pigs, (e) mermaids, (f) fabulous ones, (g) stray dogs, (h) those 
that are included in this classification, (i) those that tremble as if they were mad, 
(j) innumerable ones, (k) those drawn with a very fine camel's hair brush, (1) others, 
(m) those that have just broken a flower vase, (n) those that resemble flies at a 
distance. The Bibliographical Institute of Brussels also resorts to chaos . . . "  
- - Jorge Luis Borges, The Analytical Language of John Wilkins [134] 
8. WANTED:  ONTOLOGIES  
The net representation f knowledge is only half of the story. The question remaining is: What 
to represent? The articles in this volume address both subjects and the interaction between them. 
To solve a problem at the conceptual level, you must pick an onto logy  for your application 
area. In philosophy, ontology is the study of the concepts and categories of the world or, in 
Quine's words, What There Is. 3s In a particular AI application it is not always obvious what the 
categories, objects, attributes, entities and conceptual structures actually are. Many applications 
require both a specialized ontology and a general world ontology. IS-A hierarchies and thesauri 
(like Roger's) are ontologies. The semantic depth of the model of the domain depends on the 
richness of the ontology. 
ZeThe published efinitions in Existential Graphs for equivalence and e~clusine-or, however, ely on the use of 
coreferent propositional variables; ideally a pure Existential Graph shouldn't need these. 
37Nontechnicians may well wonder why all this is a realization worth mentioning. Logicians' interest in deduction 
with the modus ponena inference rule made them preoccupied with implication and therefore disjunction since 
A =~ B is more briefly represented as-~A v B than as --(A ^  --B). Frege [27] used implication itself as his primitive 
for this reason. Likewise, Peirce first used disjunction and universal quantification as the basis of his 'Entitative 
Graphs' until he saw the light and abandoned them in favor of Existential Graphs based on conjunction and 
existential quantification--he 'vivified' his semantic network in 1896 [24] but retained the nested negation loops 
for full expre~dveness. Hecalled such a representation 'iconic' because the net is like an icon or picture of the 
meaning in which the existing objects and relations are each directly represented. 
3SSome Huaserllan ontologists have reinvented semantic networks! [135] 
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Most AI ontologies ince the Situation Calculus was presented [136, 137] treat situations 
or states of the world (snapshots of the predicates which hold at a particular time) as objects 
which can participate in relations. A situation is changed by an event o a new situation. Such 
'event-pulse' models have also been enhanced with more explicit representations of time [138]. 
Virtually every ontology has some notions of time and space, s9 
Common situations in ordinary life are described with stereotyped frame systems or 'scripts' 
which amount o specialized mini-ontologies. For example, there is a 'restanrant-script' network 
for a visit to a restaurant which describes the usual features like 'WAITER SERVES FOOD TO 
CUSTOMER' in their proper sequence. There are script-based systems for understanding atural- 
language reports in specific subject areas, as well as Story Understanding Systems which have 
script-llke descriptions of standard plot themes [145]. 4° 
As the subject narrows further, modern technical thesauri for specialized fields are abundant 
ontological sources and some are immense [146]. They are used for automated document retrieval 
and the subject of computerized thesauri is now a solid part of modern Information Science. The 
article by Mili & Rada deals with the Medical Subject Headings (MESH) classification with over 
50,000 medical terms classified in 15 tree-structured hierarchies. 
8.1. The Cyc Project 
The most ambitious semantic network project at present is the Cyc project under the direction 
of Douglas Lenat and R. V. Guha [104,126,147]. Its main goal is to provide an ontology for the 
real world. This is a 10-year project o put in a knowledge base almost all of the factual knowledge 
that a person is assumed to have before reading an encyclopaedia. This includes 'common-sense' 
knowledge, such as that people have physical existence, families, lifespans and desires, that two 
solid, rigid objects cannot occupy the same space at the same time, and so on. 4z Simple desk- 
encyclopvedia knowledge will also be added. Cyc's creators anticipate that there will eventually 
be around 100,000,000 axioms or facts in the knowledge base. 
Including such a massive amount of knowledge is proposed in order to overcome the 'brit- 
tleness' of current expert systems, as illustrated in the broken gas pipe example in Section 1.2 
in which the expert system was unaware of the ridiculousness of the IF-THEN rule because it 
had no underlying ontology for gas pipes, leaks, rock stars, or geometry. Instead of relying on 
suggestive names which lack effect on the system's behavior, 42 Cyc would have concepts and 
hierarchies and constraints for the semantic ategories of gas pipe, rock star, etc. in a deep and 
complicated knowledge structure available for use by its inference algorithms. It is claimed that, 
unlike current expert systems, one based on Cyc could be substantially changed or redirected 
and the Cyc background knowledge would permit it to handle unexpected kinds of facts and rule 
interactions without falling apart. 
Cyc uses a frame-based semantic network along with a modified logical language for con- 
straints among slot values (such as a constraint that the age of your daughter must be less than 
your own). The semantic network apparatus i in the CycL language [126]; it is derived from 
Lenat's earlier work [124,125] and is not part of any of the eight research families surveyed in 
this volume. Although it follows the 'scruffy' tradition of its predecessors (not worrying too much 
about formalization), Cyc now has a program which is supposed to maintain a mapping between 
CycL and the more formally respectable (logic-resembling) constraint language [52]. 
There are over 20 specialized algorithms for inference like inheritance (including the slot- 
inheritance mentioned in Section 6.3), classification, 'transfersThrough' link composition 
3OA situational ontology with time and space is included in Hartley's article. The well-known Situational Seman- 
*its system of Barwise & Perry is presented in [139] (for a version using Conceptual Grapha, see [140]). Ontologies 
are included in various logic-based semantics ystems for natural anguage like Mon~agae Semantics [141] and the 
system of R. M. Martin [142]. Schubert & Hwang's Epiaodic Logic [143,144] has an ontology of situations, events, 
be.lids, time, cansation, etc. (See the ECO survey in this volume.) 
4°See Lytinen's CONCEPTUAL DEPENDENCY sttrvey. Z~'ri's article "The Descriptive Component o~ a Hybrid 
Knowledge Repre~ntation System" describes a 'template-hiera~v.hy' of frame~ which prescribe xpected features 
of various ordinary events and human activities in the world. 
4ZSuch knowledge is presumably common to almost all adults, the core being even more widespread ('horse 
selll~e ' ). 
4~This is a seductive trap in computer science, one into which Cyc itself occasionally falls [148]. 
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Figure 14. Part of the upper portion of Cyc's main ontology. 
(also described in Section 6.3), backward- and forward-chaining rules (implemented as attached 
IF-NEEDED and IF-ADDED procedures in slots; see Section 4), and inverse linking (e.g. sup- 
plying an Over slot pointing in the opposite direction of every Under slot), in addition to general 
automatic theorem-proving methods for logical formulae in the constraint language. 
Cyc is divided into mlc rotheor ies  which are ontologies for specialized subject domains. 
There are specific microtheories to deal with time, space, knowing agents, etc. Tigers, atoms, 
and the Rule Against Perpetuities would appear in different microtheories. Cyc workers are trying 
to provide interfaces between microtheories by which objects first described in one microtheory 
will automatically appear appropriately described in another, related one. The main microthe- 
ory MEM (Most Expressive Mierotheory), for the world in general, is intended to represent 
'consensus reality' or common knowledge. Figure 14 shows the upper reaches of the hierarchy. 
This ontology has some surprises. A person, or any physically existing object, is classified as 
a Process, because it engages in existing during its lifetime. A substance or Stuff turns out to 
refer to the same things as IndividualObject because very piece of Stuff is an IndividnalObject 
and vice-versa. However, the properties inherited via SubstaneeType differ from those inherited 
via ObjectType in that only the former are preserved when an object is cut to pieces; the pieces 
of a wooden table are wooden but they are not tables. Each substance has a 'granularity level,' 
the small size at which it is no longer considered a substance but a collection of objects. For sand 
it is grains, for an element, atoms. These in turn are pieces of other substances so there is an 
alternation of Object-Substance-Object-Substance as th  scale changes. Event and Process are 
the temporal versions of the spatial IndividualObject and Stuff. A predicate is given a default 
time of persistence; if Fred has a haircut at noon the system should assume his HairLength is the 
same (within a given tolerance) that evening. 43 
Defeasible reasoning is very important in Cyc since about 95 percent of its knowledge is 
defeasible (i.e. subject to exceptions). The usual problems of inheriting conflicting information 
abound. To resolve a conflict, competing arguments are analyzed; the methods of doing this are 
vague or scruffy at present but they have the merit that they are part of the knowledge base 
rather than a complicated revision of logic [112]. a4 
Propositions can be reified (treated as things) and these things can be in minds. A sentient 
agent such as a human being, robot or higher animal is classified as a CompositeTangiblelntangi- 
bleObject having dual existences as TangibleObject (body) and IntangibleObject (representation, 
mind). 45 Collective agents like corporations or governments are provided for. All agents may 
have Beliefs, Goals, Dreads, Purposes and Desires. Case relations (roles) are ActorSiots in an 
Event frame. 
43This addresses the 'frame problem' (nothing to do with 'frames') in Ah deciding which predicates change 
truth value as a result of an event and avoiding having to specify which ones don't. 
44This is not to say that C~c's logic is pedestrian. It uses five truth-values: True, Defa~ltTrue, Unknown, 
DefaultFalse and False, with appropriate ruth-tables for negation and the connectives. 
45They may have different ages, to accomodate Dr. Frankenstein's monster. 
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8.2. The Holotheme 
J.L. Jolley's Ho lotheme [149] also classifies everything, but in a single scheme based on 
structural complexity. Any objector elation is put in a broad pigeonhole-category represented as
a string of bits in which four facet-dimensions (see Section 12.4) are substrings (each dimension's 
cardinality is a power of 2). The bit pattern for the basic categories i xxx.xxxx.xxx.x. Julius 
Caesar or any real person, for example, is in basic category 101.1000.011.0. 
The first dimension, integrative levels (3 bits), is based on overall generic complexity. For 
objects the chain is: members of sets (000.0), FULL SETS (000.1), points (001.0), GEOMETRIC 
FIGURES (001.1), photons (010.0), PARTICLES (010.1), atoms (011.0), MOLECULES (011.1), 
organdies (100.0), CELLS (100.1), organs (101.0), PLANTS & ANIMALS (101.1), departments 
(110.0), ORGANIZATIONS (110.1), local governments (111.0), NATIONS (111.1). The more in- 
dependent units, in upper case, are indicated by the first bit of the second dimension, formative 
grades; its other three bits distinguish among units, collections, series, and systems of discrete 
objects at each level, or else simples, miztures, laminates, and runs of substances. Often a full 
system built up from a lower level amounts to a unit at the next level up (as in Cyc). The third di- 
mension, semantic types (3 bits), classifies active/passive attributive/entitive relations/terms, 
where each slash is a binary division; qualities are passive attributive tetras (001) whereas activ- 
ities are active entitative relations (110). The final bit for reality/fiction distinguishes Canada 
(111.1000.011.0) from Ruritania (111.1000.011.1). The meanings of the dimensions are not 
fully independent. A relation has bits (in reverse order) for: reflexive (aRa ?), symmetric 
(aRb ~ bRa ?), transitive (aRb A bRc ~ aRc ?) and 'transversive' (is a's class unlike b's, 
as in a E b ?). Inclusion, for example, is 0101. Numerous mathematical notions are similarly 
classified. 
Jolley notes that in this ontology 111.1111.111.1 refers not to God but to an interactive system 
of earthly sovereign states. The digestive tract is a series at the organ level. The Holotheme 
model as developed so far seems 'too neat' in aim while the actual classifying is 'too messy.' The 
usefulness in AI of such a scheme depends on the amount of information which can be inherited 
from a basic category due solely to its value in a particular dimension (along with any other 
information stored directly in the category). 
8.3. The Wordtree 
The Wordtree by Henry G. Burger [150] is a unique attempt o define word-meanings and 
concepts by combining pairs of more primitive concepts. It includes an immense vocabulary of 
what he calls transitives (like transitive verbs) each of which is a combination of two others. 
There is a base level of 44 primitive undefined verbs, each with a putative opposite, e.g. CRE- 
ATE/UNCREATE, SPATIALIZE/VOID and CONVEX/CONCAVE, from which the rest are 
built using an operator '&' (which only sometimes means real logical conjunction).4° To Fasten 
is to Hold & Stay, to Stay is to Unchange & Spatialize, To Nitch is to Fasten & Bundle, etc. See 
Figure 15. The book contains a valuable ontological model even though it is idiosyncratic and 
the author is more interested in the thoroughness of the word list than its logic or consistency. 
Its best use may be to inspire a more formalized 'concept-tree' adapting its ideas [151]. His word 
senses hould be separated and the meanings of 'opposites' and the various senses of the '&'s 
should be semantically disambiguated. The Wordtree system depends on the non-equivalence of 
concepts X = A&(B&C) and Y = (A&B)&C, i.e. the '&'s must not be associative. 
8.4. Causal and Evidential Links 
Many ontologies use causal links to form a deep causal model underlying the behavior of a 
physical system. Causal links are specialized relational links which indicate the propagation of 
change. 
Causality involves dependency and time. In a mathematical formula like P = VA each 
variable depends on the other two so a change in any one affects the others and there is no causal 
4eBurger suggests that 43 of the 44 may be further decomposed but omits the decomposition. His one primordial 
primitive is CFtEATE/UNCREATE. 
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Figure 15. Examples of definitions in The Wordtree. The words in capital 
letters are six of the 88 primitives (including opposites), from which the rest 
are made. 
ordering. In contrast, throwing a ball through a window causes the glass to break--breaking the 
glass does not cause a ball to have been thrown. Causal models of dynamic systems use influence 
diagrams to show which components influence which others; this may also show which parts of a 
system are irrelevant. 
CONCEPTUAL DEPENDENCY (see Lytinen's urvey) offered various causal inks between states 
and events: 
• Event result  State---the vent brings about the state. 
• State enable Event - - the  state makes the event possible. 
• State disable Event - - the  state makes the event impossible. 
• Event i ns t rument  Event - - the  first event is instrumental to the second. 
• (Event or State) in i t iate  MentaIState--the vent or state brings about the mental state. 
• MentalState reason Event - - the  mental state gave rise to the event. 
Pdeger & Grinberg [152] distinguish several species of causal dependency linking different 
combinations of actions, tendencies, and states, as shown in Figure 16, a causal diagram for a 
thermostat. The general causal direction is counterclockwise. In the Confluence link an output 
is controlled by a formula relating two inputs. 
Similar influence diagrams in the AI field of Qualitative Physics [138,153,154] can be rendered 
in semantic networks as specialized concepts and relations, and the rules governing such diagrams 
(constraining equations based on numeric values or on qualitative predicates like hot, high, rising, 
or ezploding) can be incorporated within the network itself or added to the inference procedures. 
A network of causal inks can be overlaid on an otherwise non-causal semantic network. 
Causal networks have been used in medical diagnostic programs as 'deep' knowledge un- 
derlying the observed correlations of symptoms [155]. For example, Patil's ABEL  system [156] 
represents causal relations at several evels of detail, in which each higher level network is de- 
scribed in the more detailed network below it. Figure 17 shows three levels of relations among 
certain acid-base disorders of metabolism: first the highest and simplest clinical level of observed 
disorders, then an intermediate l vel, then the pathophysiologic level showing the most detail. 
Graph-theoretically, a net of causal arrows may be embedded in the more detailed net below it, 
and corresponding nodes are linked by vertical ines which show that certain conditions exist at 
multiple levels. 47 See also [103]. 
4tit may be that all representations of the physical world or other complex domains hould have multiple levels 
of description like this. See the article "Granularity Hiersxchies" by MeCalla, Greer, Pospisil & Barrle. 
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Figure 16. A causal network far a thermostat in Rieger P., Grinberg's net 
notation. Each arrow is a specific kind d catmal influence. 
Every directed causal link between two states or facts involves two ev ident ia l  l inks (in 
opposite directions) between them. Although fire causes smoke and not vice-versa, fire is evi- 
dence of smoke, and smoke is evidence of fire. Pearl [107] uses a probability-based network of 
proposition-nodes and causal inks (see Figure 18) with numeric weights to indicate how strongly 
one proposition-node supports (is evidence for believing) another. The probability of any one 
node being true depends on all the other nodes in the network, except hat certain nodes become 
irrelevant if blocked by certain sets of supporting nodes. Finding these separating sets in his sys- 
tem depends on causal direction. In Figure 18, "The sprinkler was on" is good reason to believe 
"The grass is wet" and, separately, "The grass is wet" is good reason to believe that "It rained 
last night," but 'q~he sprinkler was on" is certainly no reason to believe "It rained last night." 
The belief path from P~ to P1 is said to be "blocked" by Q. However, due to the converging 
causal directions of the links, P1 and/>2 are not separated into independent sets by knowing the 
truth of Q. Because both P1 and P2 are known only as possible causes of wet grass, they become 
mutually dependent--knowing either one destroys the support for believing the other. (There's 
no such dependence or blocking among effects R1 and R2.) Pearl calls this dependence and 
blocking effect the defining characteristic of causal direction and claims that it doesn't depend 
on time's direction. 4s 
Causality is controversial, although most people agree at least that something in the cause 
must happen earlier in time than something in the effect [157]. A true causal ink involves both 
an actual physical link (or trajectory or force) between thing~ and an evidential dependency 
between associated propositions. 
4s He also has a probabilistic nterpretation f multiple, defeuible inheritance u~ this kind of weishted eviden- 
tial link as a defeasible IS-A ]ink. "Birds fly" means that if all you know is that Tweety is a bird, your expected 
probability that Tweety does not fly is below a very sm~ threshold called epeil0n, but this nu W be revised if you 
gain new, relevant informstion (e.g. Tweety is a penguin) that renders the Tweety--*BlRD link inoperatlve [107]. 
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Figure 17. A causal network showing three levels of increasing detail. This 
is Patil's model of electrolyte disorders with diarrhea as the cause, shown at 
all three levels. Certain conditions exist at multiple levels, indicated by the 
vertical ines. 
ring 
Grass is wet 
Q 
[ Shoes get soaked J ! The lawn is shiny] 
R1 R2  
Figure 18. Pearl's causal network. Left: A network with a 'separating set' 
of nodes based on the causal arrowheads; knowing truth values of nodes in 
this set makes the uppe¢ part irrelevant o the lower paxt. The 'w's stand 
for the probabilistic llnk-weights indicating degree of support. Right: If Q 
is known it supports all of the other nodes, but if P~ becomes known, Q 
ceases to support PI. The arrowheads show the causal direction of otherwise 
bidirectional suppo~ links. 
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8.5. Semiotic Links 
Another specialized kind of link is the semiotic llnk between a representation a d that which 
is represented. There is such a link between the actual physical pattern of the tracks in the London 
Underground (subway) and the t~he well-known schematic map of the system. There is another 
such link between the map and my mental recollection of the map. The pattern 'travels' along 
these semiotic links from the represented thing to my mind. Most information in the original 
pattern is lost in the process but certain information is preserved. This is equally true of more 
abstract conceptual patterns like semantic nets. 49 A semantic network which represents entities 
which may themselves represent (such as minds, texts, maps, etc.) needs semiotic links. 
9. DISCRETE NETS IN A CONTINUOUS WORLD 
A semantic network is a discrete structure as is any linguistic description. Representation 
of the continuous 'outside world' with such a structure is necessarily incomplete, and requires 
decisions as to which information is kept and which is lost. 
In pattern recognition, a transition is made from continuous input data to a schematic spatial 
representation (by means of low level signal processing and 'feature xtraction' of features like 
object boundaries) and thence to a symbolic description. Semantic nets describing the scene 
or situation are generated only at the end of this process. However, a net describing possible 
expected objects may be used to help disambiguate ambiguous input, for example in semantics- 
driven parsing programs which eliminate semantically nonsensical interpretations. If there is an 
expected arrangement of certain objects and spatial relations then, after initial preprocessing, 
Syntactic Pattern Recognition can parse a two- or three-dimensional scene into semantically mean- 
ingful objects based on a formal graph.grammar [159,160]. (See also the article "Introduction to 
Graph-Grammars with Applications to Semantic Networks" by Ehrig, Habel & Kreowski.) 
Often, reasoning is done with a dual representation: both a continuous mathematical model 
(e.g. a spatial representation, map or system of equations) and a discrete semantic network or 
linguistic description. Geographic and pictorial databases [161,162] require such an approach, s°
CAD systems normally require too much precision to be useful for interpreting linguistic spatial 
descriptions; if I say "Put on your hat" I don't specify X and Y coordinates. Some systems 
are being developed which allow looser, natural-language-like d scriptions using case relations 
(prepositions) which 'underspecify' position [165-167]. sl 
9.1. Semantic Control of Continuous Models 
Dynamic physical systems from thermostats o oil refineries to aircraft in flight are modelled 
in control theory which uses differential equations to describe how the outputs of a system vary 
depending on the inputs, and yields corresponding 'control aws' for setting the inputs so as to 
keep outputs within a desired range. In real-time operation a controller supplies control signals 
based on the values of system sensors; the control laws are fixed in advance. In complicated 
environments with unexpected events and changing missions and priorities (such as air combat) 
classical control theory is inadequate since new models and new control laws must be selected 
from time to time based on semantic descriptions of the model states. This is called semantic 
control  and, because of their multiple levels of abstraction, semantic networks are the language 
of choice for state description [169]. 
49Marty's Peircean article "Foliated Semantic Networks" treats such links as an extension of the dyadic 'con- 
cepts,' linking individuals and their attributes, described in WiRe's article. Peirce hlmself, however, imd~ted 
that semiotic links are inherently triadic sign-relations ~ce  a reprel~at~ion can only relX.e~.nt an object to 
someone. Zadro~.ny is formulating networks of triadic sign-links [158]. IS-A llnka may ultimately be t~d ic ,  
with the purpose of the classification as the usually omitted third argument. [S.A(~orpoise, mammal, bioiogll) but 
IS-A(porpoise,figh,fishing) in some locales. 
S°The article by Rucker & Aldowaisan propose~ two mult31evel r~presen~tiolu~, of ~ and of vision, with 
a ' juxtaposition' of high-level spatial case relatious at the proper places in a hi~a-level schematic diagram. SimilAr 
approaches are taken in [163,164]. 
51picture analysis based on eliciting spatial prepositional relations from line drawings is described in [168]. 
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Semantic ontrol theory adds rules of change for the concepts, features and values in a classical 
Systems Theory state description, to form what amounts to a network of transitions in time 
between different semantic nets. The rules trigger and constrain state transitions. One semantic 
net represents the current semantic state and others represent goal states; the system must 
explore a space of state changes from one net to another according to the rules of change and 
the latest information, since the nets also change in real time [170]. When a path to a goal 
state is found, a series of 'program generators' generate the necessary executable functions for 
the controller which correspond to the path of desired state-changes [171]. The change rules 
may dictate discrete changes in the net like addition or deletion of objects or relations--the 
system is therefore self-modifying--and these changes can be specified by an augmented graph- 
grammar. This is a natural development ofMesarovid's "teleological self-organization" extensions 
to Systems Theory [172]. 
Semantic ontrol involves using AI techniques to reason at a higher level of abstraction than 
the base level of system sensors and controls. The hierarchies in semantic nets allow this; instead 
of dealing with wing flap controls, an aircraft control system may deal with high-level strategies 
like "sacrifice enough weapons to extend flight range, avoid ground radar #407, distract enemy 
MiG #3 for ten minutes and head for the nearest landing spot.'52 Hierarchic, multilevel descrip- 
tion is used in semantic ontrol in order to ascend to the highest applicable level of abstraction 
and perform all possible reasoning at that level. Using the result, the system selects or perhaps 
automatically designs the control model, and finally creates the control inputs in accordance with 
classical control theory. The full armory of AI techniques may be used at the higher levels within 
the limits of real-time processing. 
10. RELEVANCE AND SALIENCE 
It is important in reasoning to consider the relevant objects, features and relations in a 
situation and to disregard the obviously irrelevant. Requiring a causal connection, as described 
above, is one approach. A severe problem of knowledge bases based on ordinary logic or default 
logic is that all of the facts in the represented world have a chance to bear upon any question. 
To accept a default inference a system must inspect he entire knowledge base just to insure that 
no other fact will implicitly override the inference a huge waste of time. 
10.1. Limiting Access 
Semantic nets, because they are directly implemented as structures in a computer, offer 
an automatic indexing or arrangement of knowledge in which some knowledge is more easily 
accessible than the rest. A common presumption is that facts relevant o a concept will he 
reachable from that concept by following link paths, and that relevance will diminish with distance 
in the net. Some systems, fike KRL [56] and some of Cyc's specialized inference components 
(Section 8.1), simply cut off access during query processing at, say, 25 links away from the 
queried concept. 
Another way to limit the search to relevant nodes is to require similarity in some respects. 
Cluster-based associative networks use numerically weighted similarity-links. 53 For example, 
Findler [178] defines a cluster of nodes relevant o any given node by calculating weighted asso- 
ciation links between the nodes, based on an average of 'closeness' in several feature dimensions 
(like size, severity, age, etc.), including in the relevant cluster only those nodes linked with a 
weight over a certain threshold. The cluster structure is thus derived from the values of node 
52Various abstraction hierarchies occur in knowledge-based simulation and control systems, some based on a 
description of physical structure, other# on a description of behavior (functiomd task decomposition); see [173] 
which uses both. STEAMER [174] has multiple levels of object abstraction and HIRES [175,176] uses levels of ~r0cgss 
abstraction. For interacting parts of a machine, Joskowicz [177] presents a hierarchy of physical object assemblies' 
kinematic behavior dependent partly on internal structure (using an abstracted 'configuration space' of the parts' 
possible configurations given their shapes and constrained freedom of movement) and partly on the purpo6e of the 
assembly. Straightforward PART-OF hierarchies are also nsed. 
53"1~Ie semantic networks have specific mean in~l  relational l nbR~ 
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attributes and very similar nodes are bound to be in the same cluster. The SHRIF system [179] 
based on this method is a currently implemented medical information retrieval system which 
wastes no time on searching irrelevant areas of the database. 
To achieve tractability in searching for relevant facts, the search space in a semantic net 
may be compartmentalized. Access-L imlted Logic [180, 181] is a formalized frame-and-rule- 
based semantic network system in which any information ot accessible via a chain of relations 
(links) cannot be used in a rule. Also, every slot-value pair or rule is in one or more overlapping 
'partitions' (subsets of the entire net); in automatically answering a query, a sequence of rules 
may not cross the boundaries of a partition. There is no global access to rules. The knowledge 
base as a whole is only 'Socratically complete' which means that only by a getting the right 
series of explicit questions (which each allow crossing of a partition boundary) can the system be 
guaranteed to make every valid inference using the whole network. Rule-based inference is thus 
effectively compartmentalized ( xhaustive search occurs only within a partition) except when the 
user chooses to look farther afield. The partitions are to be "somehow semantically cohesive." 
Subject area taxonomies called Topic Hierarchies may be used to limit search to relevant 
areas. They are not quite the same as the generalization hierarchies for objects and events 
discussed so far. The concept CHICKEN has many links to others, but the relevance of these 
depends on the topic; if the topic is Embryology certain links of CHICKEN are relevant but not the 
SEASONINGS link to TARRA6ON. Although it is little realized, a Topic Hierarchy is ultimately 
based on some (genuine) generalization hierarchy of people's purposes. If your purpose is to cook 
a chicken then the embryological, historical, or evolutionary information is largely irrelevant. 
Within a military topic there may be several alternative descriptions of the same terrain, the 
relevance depending on the task at hand. 54 Topic Hierarchies for controlling access to semantic 
networks are explained in the ECO survey by Cercone et al. 
The AI and Cognitive Science fields increasingly view analogy as a central part of everyday 
reasoning. Analogy establishes parallels between features of different objects, events or situations, 
and may be based on a mapping between the graph-theoretic structures of the two applicable 
semantic nets [182-184]. Metaphors like "Richard Nixon is the submarine of foreign policy" are 
intended to transfer only salient features from submarines to Nixon: lethality, hidden movement 
and surprise attacks perhaps, but not that he takes to water or has propellers in his rear. To 
limit the relevant features available for analogy, Way [185] uses a system of 'salience masks' to 
mask out irrelevant parts of the generalization hierarchy. 55 The question "Why is a raven like a 
writing-desk?" is annoying because the only notable common generalization is PHYSICAL-THING 
and no feature is salient. 
11. D ICT IONARIES AND SEMANTIC PR IMIT IVES 
If nodes and links are to be more than meaningless tokens there needs to be some way to 
probe their meanings. One approach is to integrate a formal exicon or d ic t ionary  closely with 
the database of assertions. Each definition in the lexicon is itself a semantic network which is 
accessible to the computer. There have been extensive fforts to use existing natural anguage 
dictionaries as the source for a formal conceptual lexicon for AI [17,186]. 56 
Quillian's Semantic Memory Model [187, 188], the best known of the early semantic networks 
in AI, is an encoding of a dictionary. Each word-sense has a plane which includes the network 
representing its definition. See Figure 19. Labelled links are used within a plane including 
superelass (i.e. IS-A), modification, subject/object, 57 and logical links AND and OR. A typical 
S4Even within strictly 'scientific' topics there are variations. There are different affinities among biological 
species dependln~ on whether genotype, phenotype or surmised evolutionary h~tory is the primary taxonomic 
criterion. 
5SWeber's connectionist mac~hlne for handling saUence-based metaphor (using special aspect hub nodes) is de- 
• ~ribed in Sh~tr i 's  article in this volume. 
56Slator's article "Sense and Preference" describes one such effort based on Lo•gman'a Dictionary o/Con|em- 
par~r~ E~gliah, which uses a restricted set of words in delinitions and has codes for various categories of word 
meanings. 
57Other case relations like from are not links but are treated as separate verb-like words with their own sub- 
ject/object links. The double arrows from USE in Figure 19 are subject and object links. 
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definition specifies a superclass and modifications of it, thus implementing inheritance. Each 
word is defined at a 'type-node' for the word which points to a defining plane for each of the 
word's senses; all uses of the word (in other definitions) are 'tokens' (pointers) which point to its 
type-node. 
In processing natural anguage text it is necessary to pick the most likely among multiple 
senses of a word, that is, to disambiguate. The semant ic  intersect ion between two concepts 
is the set of concepts which best relate the two, found by spreading activation in which links are 
followed and nodes activated in breadth-first fashion starting at both source concepts. Where the 
two spreading 'spheres' of activation intersect, there is the result. Thus CItY and COMFORT 
intersect at SAD as shown in Figure 19; this is used in interpreting text to show which of the 
various senses of crying and comforting are related. 5s 
1,1 11 ,L" . . . . . . .  
+~-"~ f~ ' -~ I I  7~,,,~'~¢ -  PEOPLE 
AuvE WnH3 GE'~ . %"., .b-" ~o~ L . " . .  ~. 
/ /  I I = ~\,,~FOO.V OR OR III * -. _ - -  
HAVE MAKE I GIVE5 MAKF__2 
"~>.$OUND61 XL~LES$2 
$ i "~,s^o SAD : 
Figure 19. QuiUian's representation f word senses. Top: Two senses of the 
word "plant." A "plant" can be a structure which lives, has a leaf and gets 
its food from air, water or earth, OR an apparatus people use for a process 
in industry. The dashed links are pointers to other defining planes. Bottom: 
The semantic intersection of CRY and COMFORT is SAD---one sense of CRY 
means MAKE a SAD SOUND, and one sense of COMFORT means MAKE 
LESS SAD. This helps choose the preferred senses of "cry" and "comfort" in 
a text containing both. 
Quillian considered the full meaning of a word to be the sum total of all the structure built 
by recursively substituting for each word its definition. In a semantic network, substituting the 
defining net of a concept for the node representing the concept itself is, in fact, a graph-grammar 
substitution of a complex graph for a simple one; see Figure 20. Such a substitution is an increase 
in granularity and detail, a semantic 'zooming in. '59 If a question answering system looks up a 
concept-dictionary definition and the structure of the defining network is not adequate to decide 
the question, infinite regress eems possible as each defining term is itself looked up, as in the 
case of natural anguage. Either there is some elemental level of conceptual primitives which are 
undefined, or there are vicious cycles (concepts defined in terms of each other) in the definitions. 
Whether true semant ic  pr imit ives exist is controversial [190, 191]. The best-known prim- 
itives proposed for AI are those in Schank's original CONCEPTUAL DEPENDENCY theory (see 
5aHendler's article "Massively Parallel Marker-passing in Semantic Networks" describes special computers which 
do this directly in hardware for disambiguating word senses in text. 
5°Much like net refinement, the hypernct refinemenl of [189], or the expanalon of descriptive conmtr~ct 
graphs [122]. See adso the article on formal graph grammars by Ehrig et al. 
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Figure 20. A graph-grammar substitution rule is used to expand a node into 
its dc~nln S net. The AmAll arrows indicate the set of atta~-hln~ points which 
must he preserved. 
Lytinen's urvey). The notion of semantic primitives is not new--it was the basis of Leibniz' Ars 
Combinatoria 6° and Bishop John Wilkins' splendid Essay towards a Real Character and a Philo- 
sophical Language [196] as well as many of the other 17th Century attempts at an ideal philosoph- 
ical language or Characteristica Uniuersalis for inter-cultural communication [37, 134, 197-199]. el 
Axiomatic systems uch as Whitehead & Russell's Principia Mathematica [206] e2 or Hayes' Na:/ve 
Physics programme in AI [207] (or the proposed interplanetary language LINCOS [208]), are con- 
tinuations of those attempts, as are, in essence, semantic network ontologies like Cyc. 
Wierzbicka claims in Lingua Mentalis [209] that "All sentences in all natural anguages can 
be paraphrased in terms of these thirteen signs .. ." 
I, you, someone, something, world, this, want, not want, 
think of, say, imagine, be a part of, become. 
and, using them, she painstakingly paraphrases numerous verbs at length in [210]. As noted 
above in Section 8.3, The Wordtree uses 44 primitive terms along with 'opposites,' from CRE- 
ATE/UNCREATE to EMOTIONALIZE/DEEMOTIONALIZE. Julius Laffal's Concept Dictio- 
nary of English [211], with 117 'conceptual primitives' like AGGR (aggression), COLR (color), 
FOND (loving,cherishing) and VAPR (vapors, gasses, mist), is used to annotate and interpret the 
babblings of psychotics (and the Declaration of Independence). The PaEFEaENCE SEMANTICS 
approach to text understanding (see the survey by Wilks & Fass) uses about 100, but does not 
claim they are the ultimate primitives. Igor Mel'~uk's massive ECD (Explanatory Combinatory 
Dictionary) project uses 53 primitive relations [212]. 
Litkowski seeks semantic primitives using a graph-theoretic model of an existing dictio- 
nary [213]. Each word-sense is a node, each use of it in the definition of another, a directed 
arc (as in Quillian's model). The resulting digraph for the dictionary is immense. A graph- 
reduction algorithm reduces it to a core of mutually defined primitive concepts which contains 
the smallest possible set of 'circular definitions.' All other concepts are defined using concepts in 
the core. Instea~i of primitive undefined concepts, there are only primitive cyclic structures. A 
first phase of this technique reduced a set of 20,000 verbs in Webster's Third New International 
Dictionary to under 4,000 [214,215]. 
Some complain of the inefficiency of a complete reduction to primitives (granting that it is pos- 
sible at all) due to the considerable cost of processing and storing fully expanded escriptions, es 
S°Inspired partly by the attempted combinatory philosophy of Ramon Llull [192,193] and pm'tly by the ingeniotm 
conceptual combinations in written Chinese chareg:ters, this system uses prime ~ to ~ t  la~mitive 
concepts and combines them by multiplication to create compound concepts, based cm the unique facton'Zati~m 
of any mimher into its constituent primes [194]. An elaboration which combines the coaatitueata and preserves 
the order in which they are given, called G~lel-mlmhering [195], is baaed on multildYlng powers of ccmsecutive 
primes. 
6!Compositional 'ontologic,d gr,,mma,~' built from primitives occur in the systems of Lodwick (or 
Lodowyck) [200], Dalgamo [201] and Wilkln*, as well as the ~ devised ~ of two 
central Australian civilizations (one consisting entirely of hmmu~phrodites) [196]. P ~  ~ (compo- 
sltlonal systexns of primitive 'self-evident' symbols or hieroglyphs) axe also relevant, ~e  ~202] or ~ more x~mt 
SAFO [203] and Sem~nto#~ph~/Bliso1'mboliee [204,205]. Original editiem of nm~ works of this type are in 
the Philip Mills Aenold ~Jemeiolog~ Collection, Rare Book Department, Olin IAIrm.y, W ~  Unlverdty, 
St. Louis, Mo. 03130. 
e2The later volumes---evidently unread by mlyone, Rumell said--include a p~mit ive -~ ontology of number, 
continuity, distance, change, etc. 
e3In ordinmT serial computers, that is. Parallel lattice opexatiom are actually improved; see Section 13.2. 
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but a system formally based on primitives need not use them in the normal course of business. 
It is only when the finer-grained efinitions become relevant hat recourse need be had to the 
dictionary. This is a matter of reasoning at the right level of detail or granularity, which depends 
on the task at hand. 
12. INTERSECTING INFERENCE H IERARCHIES  
The hierarchy of the world's concepts is not arbitrary; we do not use or need a mental concept 
for every possible combination of qualities, relations or objects. We have a relatively sparse 
and efficient encoding of the structure of the world, partly inborn and partly learned, based on 
economy of mental effort and subjective usefulness. The world's customary categorical system 
has a divided structure in that there are major components which axe mutually independent or 
only interact in constrained ways. The conceptual structure of trust law, for example, has few 
connections to that of bee anatomy. Various shape descriptions may be interrelated but they 
are all independent of color. A high priority for this field is to 'factor' the conceptual hierarchy 
or 'tease out' component sub-hierarchies which are amenable to easy computation. In other 
words, Divide And Conquer. This may seem like the recent AI trend towards hybrid systems 
of independent, specialized reasoning components, but I believe all the components can operate 
within the unified mathematical framework of Order Theory (the theory of ordered sets including 
Lattice Theory), as discussed below. 
An assertional semantic net (relational graph) participates in many different partial orderings 
which may be used for rapid inference; these are derived from the meanings of its nodes and links 
as well as from its pure graph structure. 
12.1. Inferential Semantics 
One result of the original work of the Cambridge Language Research Unit (see Section 2.2) 
is Inferential Semantics by the late A.F. Parker-Rhodes, a difficult and largely unappreciated 
book belatedly published in 1978 [216]. It combines mathematical Lattice Theory with semantic, 
syntactic and even tonal analysis of sentences. Two kinds of lattice are used: a lattice arrangement 
of the semantic relations underlying a sentence, called a l~ema Graph (like the assertional 
relational graphs discussed earlier), and separate inferential lattices of what he calls the 'base 
domRin, '  of labels on the nodes in the Rhema Graph. e4 This elegantly separates assertional 
links from inferential links. 
was  
~~. . . . . .  some 
• r ~ ~ trash 
:v rcaf.lh,g 
was 
~ somo 
_ Dy ~ bought 
Larry 
comic 
was  
I\ somo 
\  11/\\ at 
by" / \   ou ht 
comic Larry 
a. b.  c. 
Figure 21. Rhema Graphs based on the sentences: a."Larry was reading some 
trash." b."Larry was reading acomic bought at the station." c. "Larry was 
reading a comic he'd bought at the station." (Boldface type indicates em- 
phasis. The various node-labels for the nodes' different inferential dimensions 
are omitted.)  
To make a Rhema Graph (Figure 21), Parker-Rhodes converts a syntactic parse tree (sentence 
diagram) of a sentence into a partially ordered set (Directed Acyclic Graph) by fusing any leaf- 
nodes which refer to the same thing. He then converts it to a complete lattice by ordering 
any dangling branches using a focus-order ing (from 'focus of attention'). The focus order 
e4A th i rd kind,  a latt ice of natura l  language yntea, was proposed in 1961 [217]. 
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distinguishes between a point of reference and a point of interest, s5 His Ithema Graph diagrams 
'take some getting used to.' In Figure 21 the solid lines represent the main semantic relations 
and the dashed arrows represent the focus ordering. Several Rhema Graphs are combined into 
one giant one for an extended iscourse or text. 
The inferential lattices apply to a Rhema Graph in the following fashion. There are several 
labels on each node in the Rhema Graph, by which the node participates in several independent 
external inferential lattices (the base domains of the labels) which operate in concert on the 
Rhema Graph. These are subsumption lattices in which any label has a position in its 'base 
domain' lattice such that it is subsumed by all node-labels higher in that lattice and it subsumes 
all lower node-labels. 
These base-domain lattices axe more structurally advanced than those in other AI systems. 
There axe different lattices for different aspects of meaning, and a node in a Rhema Graph may 
have labels from several of these meaning aspects or 'inferential dimensions.' Aside from the 
usual IS-A hierarchy or lexical lattice for objects, there is a quantifier-lattice, a case-lattice, an 
'identification'-lattice, and others. Lattice Theory determines subsumption relations between any 
two (multi-labelled) nodes, and these relations in turn control the subsumption relation between 
any two Rhema Graphs. 
He also builds the lattice of a particular base-domain from simpler constituent lattices. Simple 
structures are combined by lattice operations to create larger ones; the ultimate result is an 
abstract super-lattice which can be used directly by the computer for fast deduction (this super- 
lattice is only a 'virtual object' which need not actually be built or represented explicitly in 
memory). 
As an example, consider the case lattice of 'deep case' relations (Section 5.1) like "to," 
'Trom," "along" etc. HIS cases are not mere tokens, but are related by three different ontological 
sub-lattices (constituents ofthe case lattice), namely Phase, Mode, and Grade, shown in Figure 22. 
Phase refers to directional orientation: 'source,' goal,' 'position' (where something is), and 
'passage' (where it is not, what is passed by), all in a. Mode is whether the relation is passive or 
active: the two-element lattice in b. where states ubsume vents. Grade involves causal status, a 
three-way distinction among 'primary' (independent or spontaneous cause), "secondary" (causal 
result), and "tertiary" (stationary background involvement), represented by the lattice in c. 
position state  ourc  
passage event 
a. b. 
pnma~rt la ry  
C. 
Figure 22. The lattices of the three sub-categories of the Case lattice: a. Phase, 
b. Mode, c. Grade. See text. The links represent subsumption i the lattices, 
e.g. any source is also a position. 
The actual deep cases appear in the 'product' of these three lattices, the large lattice in 
Figure 23. There are more distinctions among these 25 cases than in the other case systems. 
Donor  for example differs from Receiver in the obvious ense of directional opposite (difference 
of Phase), and it differs from Sponsor which is a static concept (difference of Mode), and it 
further differs from Source because a donor actively instigates a tranRfer, unlike a mere source 
(difference of Grade). 
Another example, the elaborate quantifier lattice, includes, in addition to the quantifiers V
and 3 of ordinary logic, the natural numbers (finite and infinite), at-roosts and at-leasts, plurals, 
ranges, most-of, set-ors, fractions, etc. With this lattice as a factor in the inferential super-lattice 
8Slt may depend on intonation: "Jane 80t lnar r ied"  has a different focus-ordm" meshing from " J~ got 
mm~ed" even though both sentences have the same logical representation. For human beings foc~ order seems 
to  divide an assertion into an addressing part, which selects a memory address by the points o~ refexence, and a 
storing part, which stores the points of interest here. 
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Subject 
Sponsor Agent Experient 
Donor Possessor Receiver 
User 
Entity 
Object Circumstance 
Datum Ooerand Destiny Back  Location Front 
Matter Attainment Product Source Container Goal 
Instrument Route 
Figure 23. The Case lattice. This is the product of the three lattices in the 
prior Figure. Each dement in this lattice has a meaning as a 'deep case' relation 
except he bottom (empty) case. 
it can be automatic that a woman with at least four daughters i necessarily a person with 
children.6S 
A case-label and a quantifier-label would both label a particular node in a PJaema Graph, 
giving that node a place in both subsumption lattices. 67 
12.2. Other Order Intersections 
Recent research as rediscovered Parker-Rhodes' approach, establishing lattices of subsump- 
tion relations between what are really labelled relational graphs, based on external partial order- 
ings in which the labels participate. In his thesis, A Lattice Theoretic Approach to Cbmputation 
Based on a Calculus of Partially Ordered ~pe Structures [2191, Ait-Kaei presents a useful sum- 
mary of Lattice Theory followed by his own approach to subsumption using abstract data types. 
Data types in computer science are schemas which specifY the arrangement and content of data 
structures. (For example, the complez number type is specified as a two-part structure consisting 
of a real for the real-number part and another eal for the imaginary part.) Complicated ata 
types are defined using nested record structures which we can recognize immediately as frame 
systems, like Kay's 'feature structures. '6s Nested data types have an inherent ree structure 
(similar to the tree structure of macro expansions in computer languages). 
A'/t-Kaci converts these trees to nets by fusing certain nodes, using co-referential variables as 
'tags. '69 The subsumption lattice of these net-structured types depends on an external partial 
66For another lattice of quantifiers, ee Doudna's quantifier model [218]. 
erThis approach could organize the hierarchies in other systems which often have meaningful compositional 
structures of lattice-factors. Schubert and his colleagues have explored factoring the type hierarchy into specialized 
dimensions, uch as for time-intervals, color, part-relations, etc. (see the ECO survey by Cercone, Goebel, de Haan 
& Sehaeffer), but without a lattice-theoretic foundation. 
eSKay [220-222] introduced these for processing natural anguage. A feature structure is a nested frame with 
type restrictions on slot values, referred to earlier as a mchema, which describes a constituent of speech, object, or 
event. Slots are labelled and referred to symbolically and there is no fixed number or order of slots. If the nested 
frames are represented as a graph, as in Figure 6 in Section 4 on Frames, they form a tree. Tagging certain slots 
with core]erence ~ariable8 marks those slots as being identical, i.e. they are fused. This converts the structure from 
a tree into a general digraph (branches may re-converge). This kind of structure isused in unification grammars for 
natural anguage like the one in Lytinen's article "A Unlfication-based, Integrated Natural Language Proce~in~ 
System" in this volume. 
egThis method of joining what would otherwise be branches of a tree is quite common. Boley does it at 
the implement~ation level in his article on hypergraphs, and Sowa's CONCEPTUAL GRAPHS approximate Peirce's 
original "lines of identity" (see also Roberts' article) the same way. Bound variables prinkled within a linear string 
representation f a net are reminiscent of conventional logic's symbolic detritus, but I haven't found a satisfactory 
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IO :Pr ince (SO|-OF => I1:  Queen(NAIUtlEl)-TO => X2: Consort  ; 
BULKS => ginsdom);  
AIMIi~S => X2; 
lqA~IF~-TO => Princess(OBEYS => Xl ;  
BUYS => X3:Dresses; 
WEJU~S m> ](3; 
• UL~IFJ)-TO => gO) ) 
Figure 24. A sample type structure in AYt-Kaci's notation, with the graph 
representation  the right. The parentheses show the nesting. The X's are 
tags or coreference variables to show identity. Note that you cannot say in 
this system that a Prince is the SON-OF a Consort, since only one instance of 
each labelled outgoing link is allowed and the Prince is already a SON-OF the 
Queen. 
ordering on simple terms (like the subsumption order in Parker-Rhodes' 'base-domain' lattices 
of node labels) represented by some arbitrary '<' relation. The criteria for whether one type 
subsumes another are partly fundamental (the subsuming net must be a subgraph of the other 
and all corresponding nodes in the two nets must obey the '_<' relation) and partly artifacts of 
the chosen linear representation. ¢° ~1 
If relations have their own inferential hierarchy, as described in Section 6.3, then this too will 
partly determine whether one relational graph subsumes another. Corresponding lia]cs in the two 
graphs will have to obey an external '_<' ordering for relations. This relational poset, the poset(s) 
of concepts, and the basic poset of graph inclusion (for directed graphs) must all be combined to 
determine the final inferential poset structure. 
12.3. Determinables and Atfrib.tes 
Frame systems, semantic nets and databases all use the object-attribute-value triad rather 
freely. The customary implementations have been criticized [229] for a lack of 'semantic relativ- 
ity' among object, attribute and value. Formally the three arguments of a triad R(z, y, z) are 
equal and undistinguished. What is it about one of the three that allows us to say that it is 
the attribute? Philosophers discuss attributes and their values as having the determinable-  
determinate  relation [185,230-232] such as the determinable 'color' having the determinate 
value 'red.' Some mistakenly think a determinate is simply a (more specific) subtype of the 
determinable, such as thinking that 'red' is a subtype of 'color'; it isn't. A determinable may 
superficially resemble a quality but it is really a higher-order predicate which specifies a named 
range of interrelated eterminate qualities (values), one or more of which an object may have. ~ 
In fact a determinable has the effect of splitting off a piece of the full abstraction hierarchy and 
permitting separate (and with luck tractable) computation within that piece. A determinable's 
range may or may not be ordered and the values may range over partial orders and lattices 
rather than linear orders. The label base-domains mentioned in Section 12.1 are examples of 
lattice-ordered determinables. See also the analyses of scale systems and attributes in [233-235] 
alternative. 
7°There is a lattlce-theoretlc fotmdation. For automatic deduction by means of unification-based resolution 
theorem-proving, unification b la PROLOG can be done with theme type-nets ince the poset of types is 'coanpleted' 
to form & true (Brouwerlan) lattice with tmique G ~ t  Lowm" Bounds Am uniftera; see [222-224]. This corresponds 
to the ~ called 'ma~dmal joins' in CONOgPTUAL GRAPHS. Related German work on sorted logics and the 
inferel~e order d formal type-structures a4mpeare in [225]. 
71The dots in a d~a type (or in the similar 'featsre ~e~ns' of [224,226,227]) must be distinctly nar, m_d and 
have unique values; thus they are .hmctio,a. Graphically, this means that all the rdation-l inks leaving a certain 
node must have diatinct labeh (Fistmm 24). This ~r io tkm does not apply in semantic nets ~ KL-ON~. ha which 
a concept may have several inetances of the same role, much as when a penmn's SON role is filled by many smm. 
This Imam a drastic effect on the ~ oomplexity d the ~thm used to ~ e  sul~umptlon of two graphs: 
with functiomsl slots it is almost l{{m~ [219] whereas with mul t~e roles (or, equivalently, functional roaes with 
aett as  values) it is believed to be formally tmd~:idahle [106, 228]. 
72S,{bea,ges may be subtypes, however. "Crimson" is a subtype of '~red" i.e. it is a more specific quality. 
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and part 2 of WiRe's article in this volume. In music theory, for example, the four determinables 
timbre, loudness, time and pitch each have a different order structure [236]. 
12.~. Faceted Classification 
Practical real-world taxonomies occur in library book classification schemes [237]. The familiar 
ones, Dewey Decimal and Library of Congress (as well as the Bliss system), are trees of subject 
categories. Instead of a simple tree arrangement, Ranganathan pioneered the idea of faceted  
classi f icat ion [238-241] in the Indian COLOI~ classification. 7a Each book has a main subject 
code followed by five facets:  Personality, Matter, Energy, Space, and Time. See Figure 25. 
Each facet uses a separate tree-structured hierarchy of categories. Your desired subject "18th 
Century Japanese cast lead statutes" might have the general form ART:  S ta tuary  - Lead - 
Cast ing -  Japan-  18thC.  
MATTER 
pERSONALITY 
TIME 
Figure 25. Separate tree structures for each facet impinge on "18th Century 
Japanese cast lead statues." 
You might accept a book with broader subject matter, say "Antique Metal Sculpture of the 
Orient" ; this would subsume your specific subject in each of the nonempty facets, so it covers your 
subject. ~4 'Faceted search strategies' derived from this work are now used widely in Information 
Storage and Retrieval in library and information science [146,242]. Multiple inheritance xists 
only at the intersection of the facet trees and within each facet there is only single inheritance. 
Sometimes in AI the different trees are called perspectives and an individual is allowed to be 
an INSTANCE-OF classes in more than one tree although each tree allows only single IS-A 
inheritance from classes higher in the tree [243]. If this limitation is acceptable then there are ways 
to assign compact numerical codes to every possible subject such that determining subsumption 
for computer etrieval is very fast. The section on 'Type Hierarchies' in the ECO survey by 
Cercone et al. describes uch a coding method. Senyk et al. [103] use a set of intersecting facet- 
dimensions in a medical database. Separate hierarchies (not all trees) for Anatomy, Physiology 8J 
Pathophysiology, Clinical Findings, and Etiology (causes) are used together to induce a 'Nosology' 
hierarchy of diseases with specific relation-links to the values in the other hierarchies. As noted 
earlier, there is no fundamental reason that a facet (determinable) could not have any arbitrary 
ordering rather than just a tree ordering. 
To what extent useful knowledge can in fact be separated into fairly independent facets or 
determinables is a crucial question, discussed further in the conclusion. 
;'8Some limited faceting is also used in the Universal Decimal Classification. 
r4The actual COLON codes are complicated. To arrange books on a linear bookshelf, the code system has to 
yield a single tree structure. It is obtained by jumping back and forth among the facet-trees during the subdivision 
process as separately prescribed for each main subject based on practical considerations. This is unnecessary in 
computerized Information Retrieval since you can access a book or article based on all facets at once. A code 
can be quite specific: "The Prevention of the Side Effect of the Antibiotic Muscular Injection to a Cow with 
Mouth Disease in the Rainy Season of 1971" is KX,311,21;423:6,66;63;4:5.4=3'N71-u. The breakdown is: 
Animal Husbandry. Cow. Mouth. Virus Disease. Treatment. Antibiotic. Muscular injection. Side-effect. Prevention. 
"I¥opical Asia. Rainy season of 1971. 
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13. FAST ANSWERS 
Since a knowledge-based system needs to infer answers beyond retrieving the explicitly stored 
information, query processing is generally slower than in simple database systems. On the other 
hand, classical semantic networks provide faster answers than is possible using (generally worst- 
case intractable) automatic theorem-proving methods based on logic. Various graph-search tech- 
niques can be exploited. If the formal expressiveness i  less than logics then the worst-case 
complexity of restricted forms of inference can be tractable with a tra~ie-off between what kinds 
of things can be said and how fast automatic inference can theoretically be [106,131]. Even with 
the full power of logic added, a semantic network still permits those speedy inference mecha- 
nisms which can make use of its structure, which are also among the most common and direct 
inferences that people make. Formal complexity results have been published in most of the main 
research families but this has been the special concern of KL-ONE, especially the worst-case 
time complexity of computing terminological subsumption between defined concepts (Section 6). 
An earlier exhortation by Levesque [131] that this must be doable in polynomial time is now 
being rebelled against in favor of retaining maximum expressiveness, as discussed in Woods & 
Schmolze's KL-ONE survey. 
The most common method of automatic deduction in logic-based programs (like PROLOG), 
'unification-based resolution,' can be speeded up dramatically using an order-sorted logic. This 
assigns every logical variable to a particular sort or 'type' or class of individuals. The types 
are arranged in an IS-A hierarchy used for fast unification. The first half of Cohn's article 
"Completing Sort Hierarchies" explains this further. 
13.1. Databases 
Practical semantic network systems require large databases for storing asserted nets along with 
concept hierarchies and/or a concept-dictionary or lexicon. The usual access methods for retriev- 
ing records may be used to retrieve frames in frame-based semantic networks. In Information 
Retrieval, semantic nets are needed for accurate retrieval of relevant documents in preference to 
using keywords or sets of features (so a search for cases of dogs biting men won't retrieve "MAN 
BITES DOG"); the document subject descriptor is in semantic net form although the actual text 
is not [244]. 
For a factual database, an important issue is the speed of finding assertional nets. Usually, 
during automatic question-answering, a query graph is compared with the existing relational 
graphs in the database. Fully general searches for graphs, or subgraph embedding algorithms, are 
worst-case intractable but regularities and constraints in semantic nets allow fast average-case 
aCCeSS. 75 
Database theory has been split between etwork-structured databases and relational databases. 
The now-dominant relational database model identifies a record or object entirely by the values of 
its attributes; no explicit links between records or classes of records are available to the user. This 
eases the conceptual burden on users of large and fairly homogeneous business databases, but 
it is too unstructured for users of complicated multilevel databases with interrelated efinitions 
of very different objects, as in Computer Aided Design. A recent trend is to model databases 
on semantic networks in order to make use of the structure of the concepts and relations in a 
data model. Chen's Entity-Relationship database model [246] and the Nijssen Information Anal- 
ysis Model (NIAM) [247,248] are obviously close to being semantic nets. Approaches uch as 
Sandewall's Information Management Theory [249,250] apply semantic net schemas to under- 
lying relation-tuples as constraints and type-restrictions; see also [251]. The AI and database 
fields are gradually melding in the form of Knowledge Bases [252-254] and Objected-Oriented 
7~This 4Lpplies to direct searches for query graphs, as described in Levinson's article "Pattern AMociativity and 
the Retrieval of Semantic Networlm," ~ well as to enhanced ~.a~c.hcs which yield related~raphs, generaU~tions or 
specializations based on the abstraction hierarchy. EII~ [245] takes direct advantage of the abstraction hierarchy 
in e~cle~atly storing and retrieving Conceptual Graplls; the actual graphs are not stored, rather the differenceJ 
between them in the hierarchy are stored using a graph-granmuxr formalism. Both systems use the psttea'ns of 
previously stored graphs to guide storage of a new graph, gradually building up a partially ordered set of graphs. 
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Figure 26. Plunging a poset into a Boolean lattice BL (in this case 24 repre- 
sented by a four-dimensional hypercube). The nodes in the poset axe assigned 
the corresponding bit-codes (shown underlined) which can be used for one- 
machine-instruction lattice calculations. 
Databases  [255,256]. An example is the TAXIS  system described in the PSN survey by Mylopou-  
los. 
13.2. Precorapiled Lattice Codes 
Concept hierarchy operations like inheritance, classification, unification, etc. depend on calcu- 
lating subsumption of one concept by another or the common specialization of two concepts. For 
tree structures, the numerical codes described for Types Access in the ECO survey by Cercone et 
al. may be pre-calculated for every node in the tree; subsumption testing then becomes a simple 
matter of a numerical comparison. For the general case, very fast calculation (in a few machine 
cycles) is possible if the hierarchy structure is a Boolean lattice of 2 n nodes in which every node 
is represented by a distinct string of n bits, by using parallel bit-wise logic operations on the 
bit-strings. T6 
For example, the string resulting from a single AND of two such bit-strings represents the 
common specialization of the two concepts, and subsumption can be determined in one more 
operation (since a _~ b ¢~ (a A b = a) in any lattice)Y The only problems are (a) the limited 
word-length in the computer's CPU (the number of bits acted upon in one operation), and (b) 
the effort of converting your existing hierarchy structure into a Boolean lattice in advance while 
preserving the hierarchy relationships. 
The first limitation, due to word length, only slightly degrades ideal performance and could 
be cured by using a long-word-length machine. The second problem of creating an appropriate 
lattice is solved by embedding or plunging your existing hierarchy into a Boolean lattice, as 
illustrated in Figure 26. vs 
If only you could use a Boolean lattice in the first place! If every concept in the world were 
a certain combination of some of n totally independent primitive (and meaningful) qualities, 
each concept in the lattice would be represented by an n-bit code with each 'i' meaning that a 
particular quality applies; this is max imum efficiency since only n meaningful, primitive bits are 
needed to represent the 2 n concepts. Such a 'fiat' set of qualities is inadequate to capture the rich 
structures in semantic network hierarchies, but the closer you can get to using such primitives as 
7eIt is called a 'Boolean lattice' because Boolean logic operations AND, OR and NOT (or set operations INTER- 
SECTION, UNION and COMPLEMENT) axe the lattice operations meet, join and complement in this lattice. A 
diagram of a Boolean lattice is drawn as a square, cube or n-dimensional hypercube, upended on one point, as in 
Figure 26. It has 2 n nodes where n is a number of independent binary-valued variables (bits); the nodes represent 
every possible combination of those n values. Formally, a Boolean latt ice is defined as a distributive, uniquely 
complemented lattice. 
77In bit-wise logic, each bit position in a word is operated upon independently and in parallel. The AND yields 
the Greatest Lower Bound, or meet: 1011 AND 0110 = 0010, where 1 means 'true' and 0 means 'false.' 
¢SA~t-Kaci et aL [257] describe a procedure for doing this plunging which takes advantage of typical patterns 
in hierarchy structures and results in a compact lattice. Polyakov & Dunaev's use of the smallest possible set 
of their 'meronomic words' to distinguish among taxonomic ategories amounts to another compact Boolean 
embedding [93, 94]. Cohn's article "Completing Sort Hierarchies" in this volume describes an alternative 'Boolean 
completion' method esigned to accomodate arbitrary unions and intersections in addition to the poset of concepts 
supplied by the user. 
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building-blocks of concepts the fewer the extra bits needed to encode the Boolean lattice. This 
is an e.~iciency argument for semantic primitives. 
14. SEMANTIC NETS IN PARALLEL HARDWARE 
Specialized semantic network machines have been designed in which the network pattern is 
embedded irectly in computer hardware consisting of many processors linked together physi- 
cally. The processors acting simultaneously (i.e. in parallel) can take advantage of the parallel 
structure of a net. In some designs each node in the net has its own processor. Fahlman's NETL 
language [19] was created to allow processing of inheritance hierarchies by a specially designed 
parallel machine; this is described in the survey by Thomason. Hendler's article describes other 
massively parallel marker-passing machines for semantic networks and analyzes the use of the 
Connection Machine for this purpose--a well-known parallel computer with over 64,000 inter- 
connected processors operating simultaneously. Three other structured connectionist computers 
for semantic networks are described in Shastri's article (called "structured" to distinguish them 
from current primarily homogeneous neural nets). 
Despite a superficial resemblance to semantic nets, neural nets often take the opposite 
approach to Artificial Intelligence. The most typical neural nets, inspired in part by proposed 
models of biological neurons, are networks of interconnected simple processing units which have 
numeric weights on the connections. Information is not necessarily supplied in any symbolic 
form at all--the net learns from repeated examples of input patterns and adjusts the weights on 
all the connections in a 'training phase', after which the net is able to discriminate among new 
patterns and recognize those for which it is trained. No node or link has any specific meaning; 
any meaning or information is spread over the whole pattern of weights. Many enthusiasts exult 
in the lack of discernable symbolic representation a d savor the self-organizing, bottom-up, non- 
analytic aspect (the 'black-boxers'). Others such as [258-203] seek a synthesis of neural nets 
with symbolic, analytic representation f knowledge and reasoning (as in semantic nets); see the 
citations at the end of Shastri's article. The key aspect is the compositionality of the internal 
representation; in semantic nets, as in most thought, we can analyze what goes into an idea 
and how it is structured--this  the essence of semantics. The conceptual gap between eural 
'subsymbolic' processing and intelligible symbolic compositional structures like semantic nets is 
only now being explored [264]. 
Hinton [265] stores the concept-relation-concept 'triples' of a semantic net associatively in 
a neural net (the net will fill in any one part of a triple given the other two). Each concept 
has, in addition, a separate set of meaningful 'microfeatures' or numeric values representing 
primitive qualities. The network treatment of the microfeatures accomplishes a limited form of 
inheritance as described above for a Boolean lattice of 'fiat' qualities. Derthick's p-KLONE [118] 
uses similar microfeatures to calculate subsumption among concepts and among relations, and 
also for 'role-filler-type-restrictions' which restrict he classes of individuals allowed to participate 
in a relation. There can be constraints among the microfeatures (e.g. some qualities are made 
mutually disjoint). In answering a query, this connectionist realization of KL-ONE, because of 
the weighted link implementation, ranks the stored descriptions by degree of consistency with 
the query-description, and answers with the closest available answer ather than the usual firm 
yes or no. 
15. HOW TO IMPLEMENT A SEMANTIC NETWORK 
In a conventional computer, semantic networks may be custom-programmed, implemented us- 
ing built-in features of Object-Oriented Languages, or implemented in Expert System Shells with 
Object-Oriented eztensions. Almost all commercial systems are frame-based. Some commer- 
cial hypertezt systems with typed links and node hierarchies may be used to store information as 
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a semantic network, but these systems have depended on human traversal of of links (as in 
browsing) without built-in machine inference capability [268]. T9 
15.1. Programming Semantic Networks 
The most common way to implement a semantic network is to program it yourself. You have 
the freedom to tailor it to your needs with of course the corresponding hard labor and intellectual 
burden. A research-quality program for your favorite semantic network system may be available 
from its inventor. Most semantic network systems are developed in LISP, but Prolog, C and 
Pascal [13] have also been used. AI languages such as LISP and Prolog are better for developing 
and rearranging a semantic net program, while conventional compiled languages like Ada, C 
and Pascal, lacking their built-in evaluation functions, are faster for using the net program once 
its algorithms are stabilized. Many LISP textbooks describe semantic networks (see the end 
of Section 4), and in [267] semantic networks are the centerpiece of a clear exposition of logic 
programming. 
15.2. Object-Oriented Languages 
Object -Or iented languages, ystems and databases include ideas already famifiar in seman- 
tic networks and frame systems, like inheritance and procedural ttachment ( he procedures or 
programs in an object are called 'methods'). Objects (basically frames) communicate by sending 
each other messages (on arrival a message selects a 'method,' by name, from within the object)-- 
everything is done by these named procedures in objects, and access is only possible through an 
object's message handler, i.e. objects are encapsulated and their internal structure is otherwise 
hidden. Inheritance is a fundamental feature of Object-Oriented systems and languages [288,269]. 
Objects inherit attribute slots and values as well as 'methods' from classes and superclasses, s° 
Object-oriented systems are mostly concerned with operations (such as inheritance) acting on 
the world of data structures, and languages like Smalltalk or Objective C have elaborate built-in 
ontologies describing their own data structures and operations. Object-oriented systems do not 
address the general goal of representing all kinds of meaning, so they are often deemed to be quite 
far from the field of AI. Nevertheless, the semantic network community should pay close attention 
to the developments in object-oriented systems because the speed and efficiency standards are 
high and the research is very active. 
Given an existing object-oriented language it is easy to create a semantic network using that 
language. Object-oriented LISP systems like CLOS for Common LISP make this fairly painless, l
Earlier semantic nets have been implemented in the object-oriented LISP extensions LOOPS and 
Flavors; the public domain )(LISP [272] has such an extension. CONCEPTUAL GRAPHS have been 
implemented in Smalltalk [184]. Of course the quandaries that beset semantic networks, such as 
multiple, defensible inheritance conflicts, are also troublesome in object-oriented systems. 
15.3. Expert Systems with Objects 
Many commercial Expert System Shells have optional or integral object-oriented xtensions 
handy for implementing semantic networks. Typically a frame-based object/class hierarchy is 
combined with a rule-based expert system using a heuristic-search-based inference ngine. KEE, 
Nezpert Object, ART-IM, KnowledgeCrafl, KES, Laser, Level 5 Object, GoldWorkslI, AICorp- 
KBMS, Kappa, Arity/Erpert and others (often reviewed in AI Expert magazine and elsewhere) 
provide these facilities in integrated packages which include graphic interfaces, hooks to conven- 
tional programming languages and databases, etc., and are available on a wide range of conven- 
tional computers from microcomputers to mainframes. They allow you to browse around directly 
rgA hypertext is a network of ]inked text  passages with machine-followable crou-reference linltA. A word in 
a displayed text may be selected by the user; this causes another text, pertaining (and linked) to the word, to  
appear. This new text may have furthcw links to other texts. 
S°There are more kinds of object-oriented inheritance structures than just abstraction hierarchies; for example, 
method combittatlon or  code shari~tg of  program fragments involves other kinds of inheritance [270, 271]. 
sl  CLOS allows you to handle multiple inheritance by specifying an arbitrary ad hoc preference-orderlng among 
the parent superclasses of each class, to determine which parent 'wins' in a conflict. 
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in a screen diagram of the IS-A hierarchy, using a 'mouse.' Although they make no use of recent 
inheritance theory, these systems typically provide a repertoire of inheritance methods which 
may be specified for a slot, like an override parents or union of parents' values inheritance-facet 
for a particular slot. These systems are expensive and may seem slow, mainly because such a 
system has to support numerous features which may have nothing to do with your intended use 
of semantic networks. 
16. CONCLUSION 
The articles in this collection go further than I have in applying diverse disciplines to semantic 
networks and vice-versa. This rich and ambitious approach is to be expected for a practical 
computing method whose subject is 'the world.' 
Anthropomorphically, I've referred to a computer's knowledge.' Can a computer 'know' any- 
thing? It is often said that computers merely minnc knowledgeable b havior based on arbitrary 
symbols which, to the computer, are without meaning since the computer has no direct experi- 
ence of what they represent. I would answer that abstract graph-structure is an exception to this; 
a computer truly has internal graphs existing within it and can comport its behavior based on 
them. A semantic-network-based computer 'experiences' the abstract graph-structure directly, 
at least as directly as a person can, in the sense that internal graph structures result from sensory 
input and influence behavior systematically. A computer's experience of graph structure is not 
faked, s2 
Some disparage nets as a mere notational variant of symbolic logic (First-Order Predicate 
Calculus). Israel & Brachman [273] and Sown [274] have made spirited defenses of nets from dif- 
ferent points of view (model-theoretic ~nd linguistic). According to Schubert [275], the difference 
between logic and semantic networks (broadly defined, as I do) is one of emphasis rather than 
fundamentals. Strict nets extended as in Section 7 and (higher-order) Predicate Calculus (with 
equality) are alternative notations for an underlying logic; the question is, do you care about 
the graph-theoretic structure of the relations and abstractions? If you can use that structure for 
inference, you do. ss In logic a linear conjunction of many propositions normally shares numerous 
variable-letters which are free in any one proposition but are treated as bound 'place-holders' 
in the conjoined list taken as a whole. A description in Predicate Calculus is a 'ripped apart' 
semantic net which is, depending on the particular manner of the ripping, sprinkled with artifi- 
cial nonce variables tagging where the ripped pieces fit together. This was noted by Peirce, who 
invented both. 
Symbolic logic deals primarily with bricks and mortar, semantic nets more with principles 
of architecture. The semantic constraints of the upper levels of Figure 5 preclude a logical 
"jumbled heap of bricks." As noted in Section 7, nets favor 'vivid' knowledge over arbitrary logical 
constructs, even when the formal expressiveness i  the same. Some cognitive linguists reject logic 
entirely as a basis for the meaning of language. Yorick Wilks (see his PREFERENCE SEMANTICS 
summary) says that, for one sentence, multiple possible meanings (semantic nets) contend with 
each other, and that various measures are used to pick the 'best' meaning among them--this is 
wholly alien to conventional logic. Of course the ontological (as opposed to purely structural or 
model-theoretic) aspects of semantic networks have little to do with the logic question. Semantic 
nets have been closely modelled on linguistic descriptions and much of the richness of natural 
language has been adopted. And, as I have indicated, many opportunities for efficient inference 
are due to the ontological structure of the world itself which is populated with objects, predicates 
and relations which relate to one another not with arbitrary freedom, as in unadorned logic, but 
rather in severely constrained ways which induce a restricted inferential hierarchy. 
S2The more wmturesome might suppose that ~eople xperience only gr&p~ if the ultimate structure of reality 
and perception is graph-theoretic; this possibility was hinted at by K~pe and Peirce ad  is wum~ in Marty's 
article "Follated Semantic Networks" in this volume. 
S3Many automatic theorem-proving methods rely on some graph-theoretic structure of scoped logical expl~.mions 
(like Frege's ori~r~l trees [27]) or of steps in a proof, but few use the structure of relations and abmtractions 
characteristic of a semantic net. The sort hierarchy in an order-sorted logic /s a sc~antlc net. 
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All deductive inference involves inclusion. The truth of conclusions is included in the truth 
of the premises. On the other hand, all inclusion relationships can be represented by partially 
ordered sets (posets) and exploited for inference. Posets and lattices found in the world may be 
' imported' into the inference hierarchy (as Randell & Cohn do in their article on "Exploiting"). 
The unifying theory for inference in Semantic Networks is thus Order Theory (including Lattice 
Theory). s4 It is by means of this theory that different posets and lattices can be combined 
in a principled way to produce a sound virtual inference structure which can be directly used 
by a machine. Many different combining operations are available along with various well-defined 
completions and derived power-structures in the domain of power-sets. Conversely, most complex 
conceptual structures can be factored or reduced into simpler constituent structures or quotients; 
these are the facets, determinables, dimensions, pecialized aspects and primitive conceptual cores 
discussed earlier. By 1960, Lattice Theory was already recognized as important for semantic 
networks by a couple of the earliest AI researchers, Masterman and Parker-Pdaodes (mentioned 
in Sections 2.2 and 12.1), but they failed to excite many others and, within AI at least, this 
approach as languished forgotten, s5
Inferential posets are everywhere and it is clear that the human mind uses many of them 
effortlessly. The transitivity of spatial inclusion, for example, is instantly comprehended and un- 
consciously used, as is the poset of subsumption of meanings among fairly small relational graphs. 
Semantic network research should develop the principles by which all such posets may be used in 
the 'grand ontology' for inference. Dictionary definitions and other relations between relational 
graphs can be formalized with graph-grammars. I do not recommend any mathematization for 
its own sake, only for the power it offers. Semantic networks are analyzable with Order Theory, 
Graph-Grammar Theory (and some Category Theory dealing with selective preservation of rela- 
tions in certain transformations), and there is promise that these theories will permit factoring 
most concepts in the world into compact, tractable structures built from a modest number of 
semantic primitives. 
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